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ABSTRACT 
Indigenous firms from Mainland China have a strong desire to go global and are starting 
to exert increasing influence in the world's arena. Some of these firms have flourished at 
developing foreign markets through low-end disruption and have managed to avoid direct 
competition with higher end competitors. Meanwhile, China's central government has started 
to encourage indigenous firms to raise their aspirations and move toward higher end 
competition. This has prompted many Chinese firms to also enter developed, more 
sophisticated markets in North America and Europe. For those globally competitive 
businesses, it would be interesting to understand how they are actually competing and what 
their performances are. 
Previous studies on global firms from emerging economies have tended to focus on the 
role that economic policy plays in creating globally competitive industries and firms, yet this 
view focused primarily on individual firms' international entry strategies. Based on different 
streams of literature on positioning and market segmentation strategies, an integrated 
framework on these firms' positioning strategies is constructed. Testable hypotheses are 
proposed and a two-phase research design combining both quantitative (archival sources) and 
qualitative (cases) data is developed and applied. The empirical data consist of a policy-
capturing type instrument to help determine strategy and positioning at the 20 top global 
Chinese firms, as well as in-depth cases on a subset of those firms competing in different 
industries with different strategies. Both the quantitative part and cases found that Chinese 
companies positioning themselves at the lower end are generally performing better. But 
results were not unambiguous about the relation between diversification strategy and 
performance of these companies. Possible explanations are given and the findings were 
presented in narrative fashion with implications for strategic management theory, practice, 
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1.1 Research Objectives 
The large and steady growth of China's economy has created a perception of 
numerous hypercompetitive Chinese firms poised to go global, following in the footsteps 
of the major Japanese and Korean firms in disrupting global competition and taking 
markets (e.g. Zeng & Williamson，2007). This perception is derived from several sources. 
The media have played up Chinese firms increasing influence in the world's arena and 
stronger desire to go global (Business Week, 2004). This is particularly evidenced by the 
much recent merger and acquisition activity among indigenous Chinese firms. Chinese 
enterprises such as computer firm Lenovo and television maker TCL have completed 
highly visible acquisition of major foreign brands (Media, 2004). Impetus for these global 
moves has come from several quarters including the financial markets, tough competition 
in the home market and the Chinese government. China's central government in 
particular is encouraging firms to go global, and it has put a lot of effort and money into 
campaigns promoting this (Wall Street Journal, 2005). 
Yet in spite of official pronouncements of the government, and the marked 
optimism by some China scholars (e.g. Williamson & Zeng, 2004; 2007)，neither the 
private nor the state sector of China's economy has much global presence (Gilboy, 
2004) .Chinese Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are not in most cases competitive 
against locally domiciled foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) and established global 
players (Huang, 2005; Restall, 2006). Nolan (2001，p.l87) has argued that ‘‘ the 
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competitive capability of China's large firms after three decades of reform is still 
painfully weak in relation to the global giants'. He even expresses skepticism about the 
ability of leading non-state enterprises to compete globally with the major multinationals. 
Besides, much empirical evidence suggests that China is a rather chaotic developing 
economy, competitive only in narrow sectors (Enright, 2005; Huang, 2003; Gilboy, 2002, 
2004; Restall, 2006). Despite the continuing solid growth of the economy, China still 
ranks in the world in the category of industry competitivieness (Enright, 2005). 
Nevertheless, some firms such as microwave oven maker Galaiiz, and telecom 
equipment producer Huawei, have gained a significant edge by competing at the low end 
of markets (William & Zeng，2007). Sometimes this has necessitated competing in 
developing countries, but other times (following Beijing's encouragement) it means 
entering more sophisticated North America and Western Europe markets, often with 
higher-end products. What are the larger global Chinese enterprises really doing in terms 
of their strategies and what are the outcomes? How are they competing? What strategies 
are China's largest indigenous firms pursuing and how successful are they, particularly 
those competing in global markets? 
Initially, studies on global business from emerging markets tended to primarily 
focus on the role of economic policy in the creation of globally competitive industries 
(Amsden, 2000; Poter, 1990; Wells, 1983) and secondarily on firm strategy. While the 
classic strategic theories mainly suggest that companies should choose one clear position 
according to their history, resources and environment (Ansoff, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Porter, 1980), more recent strategic theories such as "blue ocean strategy" and 
disruptive innovation further indicate possible options for global business from emerging 
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markets, and introduce a dynamic element into firm competitiveness (Christensen, 1997; 
Christensen & Raynor，2003; Druehl & Schmidt, 2005; Kim & Mauborgne, 1999, 2005; 
Prahalad & Hart，2002; Schmidt & Porteus，2000). 
This thesis examines the strategies of indigenous Chinese firms. In doing so, it 
further develops the measurement of positioning strategies, and builds a model to assess 
the relationship between firm performance and the strategies these companies take, and 
the impact on the success of global businesses from China and resulting emerging 
economics of these businesses. It also considers implications for government policy 
making, and future research. 
1.2 China as the Strategic Research Site 
China's rising competitiveness in the global marketplace has inspired imitation 
from developing countries and, anxiety in the developed world (The New York Times, 
2005). By forcing prices down in other countries, China's low-cost exports are sparking 
the concern. "The China price" as was declared, on recent cover of Business Week 
magazine represents "the three scariest words in U.S. industry" as firms in China displace 
the exports of country after country, monopolize inward foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and drive down wages and prices in markets everywhere (Business Week, 2004). China's 
FDI has also created anxiety in many quarters. China's economy has grown at a real rate 
of about 9% over the last thirty years with a relentless rise in exports at rates in excess of 
20% per year over the past decade (Enright, 2005). In Washington, the multibillion dollar 
attempt by Chinese oil firm CNOOC to buy Unocal, a California rival, was widely 
portrayed in the media as a de facto seizure of strategic U.S. assets (e.g. Krugman, 2005). 
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As a result, some have represented the Chinese state as a monolithic, rational decision-
maker that, like Japan, has developed elaborate economic plans that seek to reclaim 
China's "rightful place" at the center of the world through economic manipulation of (tens 
of thousands of) indigenous enterprises, the promotion of cut rate and subsidized exports 
and aggressive FDI. In this view, China's indigenous firms are thought to be tools of an 
expansionist policy promoted by Beijing's leadership {The Economist, 2004). 
Setting aside the arguable position that Japan ever had such an "industrial policy" 
(Porter & Sakakibara，1999), from inside China, however, the picture of government 
policy and firm competitiveness is markedly different. Although comparisons with Japan 
and South Korea are outwardly appealing, there are many differences between China and 
the latter two. One major difference is the much larger and unwieldy number of (smaller) 
industrial firms in China, making it logically difficult for government to direct the 
actions of local firms (Lieberthal & Lieberthal, 2003). In general, there is little evidence 
that Beijing is directing its firms in some well thought-out master plan to take over the 
productive assets of competitors and rival countries (Huang, 2003; Gilboy, 2004). The 
Chinese government and many of its largest firms have recently started to give emphasis 
to creating globally competitive firms. Although Beijing has been pushing some to secure 
strategic resources, like oil and metals, through outward FDI, its policy levers are limited. 
Indeed, a number of Chinese companies are already solid competitors in global markets 
including Haier in white goods, TCL and Konka in TVs, Galanz in microwave ovens, and 
Huawei in telecommunications. Low cost labor matters even in sophisticated industries 
such as automobile assembly and telecom equipment. Manufacturers from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan have proved skillful at utilizing inexpensive mainland Chinese workers to 
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create suppliers in a range of products that carry a significant cost advantage over their 
competitors (Lieberthal, & Lieberthal, 2003). 
China's policy makers are trying to shift China's economy away from its historic 
reliance on low-cost manufacturing and toward technology and higher-end industries. 
The country's new leaders believe that building multinationals will make China an 
economic superpower and they have been implementing policies that will spur the growth 
of more Chinese brands. The central Government is now urging some of China's biggest 
companies to sell branded products abroad. Beijing has put commercial innovation high 
on the country's agenda. It aims to increase spending on research and development from 
the current 11 per cent of gross domestic product to 2.5 per cent by 2020 (Wall Street 
Journal, 2006b). It also seeks to reduce the country's dependence on foreign technology 
during the same period. While the Chinese government has been leery about providing 
incentives to companies to go global, it has started to remove some of the roadblocks that 
were previously blocking their Chinese MNCs, such as stringent foreign-exchange 
controls, and tedious project approval processes. Already, 22 companies with global 
potential have been supported by the Chinese government (Wall Street Journal, 2006a). 
Six of them are aiming to be among the 500 biggest companies in the world, and many 
more hope to build global brands (Zeng & Williamson, 2003). 
But since creating and sustaining brands in developed economies globally takes 
time and a great deal of money, Chinese firms will intitially have trouble competing with 
the giant Japanese and South Korean consumer electronics companies. Many believe that 
the biggest obstacle is the lack of brands and brand-building experience and ability, 
marketing talent, skilled labor, and many other intangible assets (Zeng & Williamson, 
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2007). Another McKinsey Quarterly article put it: "the question is less whether Chinese 
companies can make the grade in product features and quality and more whether they can 
develop marketing strategies for branded goods" (Gao, Woetzel & Wu，2003). 
1.3 Organization of this Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on streams of strategy studies and draws on 
several models that help shed light on Chinese firms' competitiveness: generic 
competitive strategies, growth vectors which assume a firm should benchmark the 
competition, blue ocean strategy, disruptive innovation, and low-end encroachment. 
These suggest firms should search for and create new demand other than competing 
within existing markets; and focus/diversification strategy, the latter of which is overly 
applied by Chinese companies. Literature on multinationals of developing countries is 
also presented. 
Based on the streams of work reviewed in Chapter 2 and contexts of China's 
global companies, a model is proposed linking Porter's generic competitive strategy, 
disruptive innovation, and diversification/focus strategy in Chapter 3. In summarizing the 
theory, the limited extant evidence (Zeng & Williamson，2007)，this thesis will 
hypothesize that Chinese international companies are performing better when they 
position themselves in the lower-end of the foreign markets, and when they target at a 
focus or related diversified market. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the methodology. Both quantitative and 
qualitative methods are being used to examine the relation between company 
performance and the strategy pursued. Chapter 5 presents the quantitative results and four 
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contrasting cases to further complement the results. The results showed firms that 
selected low end strategies did better in general performance, and financial performance 
in terms of average ROA and ROE, and firms that selected related diversification 
strategies performed better than firms that either targeted too broad or too narrow markets. 
In addition to summarizing the main findings, Chapter 6 discusses the main contributions 
and limitations of this thesis while highlighting implications for future research, theory, 




To provide the background and theoretical framework upon which this study is 
based, three streams of literature are reviewed in this chapter. The classic strategic 
categories suggest that firms should be very clear on their strategy choices and avoid 
pursuing more than one strategic position (Porter, 1980). This paradigm is also upon 
which this thesis' integrated model is based. A second stream of theories sees more 
opportunities for firms in the new, unexplored markets (Christensen, 1997; 2000; Druehl 
& Schmidt，2005; Khanna & Palepu，2006; Kim & Mauborgne，1999; 2000; 2005; 
Schmidt & Porteus, 2005; Sood & Tellis, 2005). The third stream of strategic theory 
especially talks about a paradoxical phenomenon between large companies in developed 
countries and developing countries (e.g. Fan, 2006; Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Rumelt, 
1982; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Apart from that, this chapter also reviews on special 
features of MNCs from developing countries when they compete globally, particularly, 
how valid theories in the West work in emerging markets. 
2.1 Classic Strategic Categories 
2.1.1 Generic Competitive Strategies 
Being the oldest and best known competitive advantage framework, Porter's 
(1980) generic strategy framework provides insight into competitive behavior. Porter 
argued that competitive advantage arises from selection of the generic strategy which best 
fits the organization's competitive environment and the organizing of value adding 
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activities to support the chosen strategy. In essence, the theory contains two elements. 
First is a scheme for describing firms' competitive strategies according to their market 
scope (focused on narrow market or distributor segments or selling to a broad range of 
customers), and their source of competitive advantage (low-cost or higher end, 
differentiation). 
In Porter's original formulation, the three main generic strategies were 
differentiation 一 creating a customer perception that a product is superior to that of 
competitors' so that a higher price can be charged; cost leadership — maintaining lower 
costs through input, material, and process innovations, and the third, focus — utilizing 
either a differentiation or cost leadership strategy in a narrow profile of market segments 
(figure 1). Porter argued that a cost leadership strategy, coupled to low price, is best 
employed in a market or segment where demand is price elastic. Since market share and 
sales are likely to increase significantly in such circumstance, companies can reduce unit 
costs further and generate above average profits. A differentiation strategy is employed in 
order to reduce price elasticity of demand for the product so that the price can be raised 
above that of competitors, and this generates above average profits. A focus strategy is 
aimed at a particular segment of the market for a product rather than at the whole market 
or many markets. Many businesses use a focus strategy to enter a market before 
broadening their activities into other related segments. 
Porter also argued that the performance outcomes of a strategic design that failure 
to choose between one of the cost- or differentiation-leadership will result in the so called 
"stuck in the middle" problem. The organization must decide whether to try to 
differentiate its products and sell them at a premium price or whether to gain competitive 
18 
advantage by producing at a lower cost than its competitors and usually selling at a low 
price. Also, it must decide whether to target the whole market with its chosen strategy or 
to target a specific segment or niche of the market. 
Even being the oldest and best known, Porter's generic strategy framework has 
come under some criticism compelling refinement. For example, a cost leadership 
strategy in Porter's generic strategy yields profitability only until the higher-cost 
competitors have been driven away from the tier in the market, and the population of 
low-cost competitors does not have sufficient capacity of supply what customers in a 
given tier of the market demand. But when the high-cost competitors are gone and the 
entire market demand is supplied by equally low-cost suppliers the once low-cost strategy 
becomes an equal-cost strategy (Christensen, 2000). Also, differentiability is destroyed 
by the mechanism that leads to modularization and dis-integration (Christensen, 1997). 
2.1.2 Growth Vector 
This theory has been one of the more influential contributions in the study of 
competitive strategy. Similar to the generic strategies model, Igor Ansoff (1987) 
developed a framework, which looked forward to the future aspect, leaving a space both 
for launching new products and creating new markets. Ansoff developed the growth 
vector with two dimensions: markets and technology. This shows potential areas where 
core competences and generic strategic can be best deployed with four broad alternatives. 
First, market penetration refers to increasing market share in existing markets utilizing 
existing products; second, market development means entering new markets and 
segments with existing products; third, product development is to develop new products 
to serve existing markets and finally diversification means, in this case, developing new 
19 
products to serve new markets. These models imply that firms can decide to compete in 
any of the four primary generic strategy categories, depending on their resources and the 
environment. The main recommendation given was to be clear about the strategy, focus 
resources on it, and do not get "stuck in the middle" (Porter, 1980). Yet some researchers 
have disagreed with the strategic freedom implied by Porter's work, arguing instead that 
firm resources are more constraining in selecting strategy (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Research from this paradigm asserts that the context firms find themselves important to 
strategy formulation (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). This implies that the China context — 
a developing market struggling to attract and internalize new technologies - is 
particularly important to the selection of firm strategies. 
2.1.3 Summary 
Both the generic strategies and growth vector model are influential classic 
strategic models, suggesting that a company should choose between strategic categories 
according to its resources and the environment (Porter, 1980; Ansoff, 1987). One 
suggests firms to pick either cost leadership or differentiation, while the other offers 
either market focus or technology focus, or run the risk of being "stuck in the middle" 
(Porter, 1980). The strategic categories of both models provided the basic framework for 
this thesis' integrated model. 
2.2 Disruptive Innovation Strategy 
2.2.1 Blue Ocean Strategy 
The dominant focus of strategy work over the past twenty-five years has been on 
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competition based strategies, which assume that industry boundaries are defined and 
accepted, and the competitive rules of the game are known. Companies try to outperform 
by grabbing a greater share of existing demand. This has been called ''red ocean strategy'' 
because of the fierce and "bloody" competition in such markets (Kim 8c Mauborgne， 
2005). On the other hand, blue oceans denote all the industries on products and markets 
not yet in existence and their unknown market space. Contrary to the 'Catching-up' and 
'Benchmarking' perspective, blue ocean strategy theory suggests that firms from the 
emerging economics might not have to compete head-to-head with their counterparts 
from the more developed economics in the same markets (Kim & Mauborgne，1999; 
2000; 2005). They may be able to seek out uncontested markets in so-called blue oceans. 
Although many companies focus on matching and beating their rivals, and share a 
conventional wisdom about demands of their customers, they solely outperform on the 
incremental improvements in cost or quality in fierce competition. It is important to 
compete with rivals in existing industries, however, with supply exceeding demand in 
more industries, this may not be sufficient to sustain high performance. Companies may 
find that creating new market space (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999; Christensen & Raynor， 
2003) to seize new profit and growth opportunities. 
Specifically, Kim and Mauborgne (2005) developed a concept known as "strategic 
move", which is the set of managerial actions and decision involved in making a major 
market-creating business offering, delivering products and services to open and capture 
new market space. There are plethora of examples in history indicating this consistent 
and common pattern in all kinds of industries, for example, Ford in 1908 with the Model 
T; CNN in 1980 with 24-hour real-time news; Starbucks, Southwest Airlines, and so forth. 
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Comparing to Porter's generic strategy, blue ocean strategy is about to drive costs down 
while simultaneously driving value up for buyers, which is a leap in value for both the 
company and its buyers achieved. While buyer value comes from the utility and price and 
company value from price and cost structure, blue ocean strategy integrates the range of a 
company's functional and operational activities. 
Conventionally it is believed that to benchmark competition, a company should 
choose a strategic position of low cost or differentiation or focus. In other words, 
companies can either create greater value to customers at a higher cost or create 
reasonable value at a lower cost. However, the blue oceans follow a different strategic 
logic, focusing on making the competition irrelevant by creating a leap in value for 
buyers and for themselves, seeking at new markets, and pursuing differentiation and low 
cost simultaneously. This strategy could favorably affect both their cost structure and 
their value proposition to buyers. Particularly, cost savings are made by eliminating and 
reducing the factors an industry competes on. Buyer value is lifted by raising and creating 
elements the industry has never offered. It is this whole-system approach that makes the 
creation of blue oceans a sustainable strategy. 
To set a company on a strong, profitable growth trajectory in the face of industry 
conditions, it won't work to benchmark competitors and try to outperform by offering a 
little more or less, because such a strategy will hardly drive a company to open up 
uncontested market space. 
2.2.2 Disruptive Innovation 
Like the Blue Ocean Strategy, disruptive innovation theory (Christensen, 1997; 
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Christensen & Raynor, 2003) suggests some constraints and opportunities for NIE firms' 
competitive strategy and gives more specific and systematic recommendations than blue 
ocean strategy. A plethora of studies in recent years have converged on the view that 
maintaining growth even slightly ahead of the general economy is difficult and is 
achieved by only ten percent of firms and usually only for limited periods of time (e.g. 
Collins, 2001; Foster & Kaplan, 2001; Corporate Strategy Board, 1998; Zook & James， 
2001). To achieved and maintain significant growth, firms must launch new growth 
businesses when the core businesses are still strong (e.g. Christensen & Raynor, 2003; 
Hamel, 2001). Harvard Business School Professor Clayton Christensen's (1997) theory of 
disruptive innovation is particularly helpful in understanding firm competitiveness and 
growth, particularly from developing markets (Christensen & Hart, 2003). Christensen 
argues that the pace of technological progress in almost every industry outstrips the 
ability of customers in any given tier of the market to use the technology, and competitive 
technology that is not good enough to satisfy customers' needs today will improve to 
provide more than enough performance for the same customers tomorrow. As a result, 
when companies stretch their products up-market, targeting customers in a more 
demanding tier who are not yet satisfied by existing products, they earn attractive profit 
margins. The successive incremental improvements represent what Christensen called 
sustaining innovations. 
When firms that are on a sustaining incremental improvement track react to 
technology disruptions by moving down-market toward customers who are over-served 
by available products, they earn less than attractive profits, thus creating a disincentive to 
do so. In contrast to sustaining innovation, disruptive innovation appeals to customers 
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who are unattractive to the incumbents. 
Hence, disruptive innovations represent a powerful means for broadening and 
developing new markets and providing new functionality, which disrupt existing market 
linkages (Abemathy and Clark, 1985; Adner, 2002; Charitou and Karkides, 2003; 
Christensen and Bower, 1996; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Danneels, 2004; Gilbert, 
2003). Disruptive innovations are new technological innovation, product, or service that 
can eventually overturn the existing dominant technology or product in the marketplace 
without necessarily catching; up to it in functionality. The disruptive innovation only 
must satisfy the needs of main segments of the market. Disruptive innovation typically 
involve simple adaptation of known technologies, however, entrants usually beat 
incumbents because established companies are not motivated to push that new innovation. 
For this reason, companies that want to create new growth and sustainable market 
positions should seek disruptive opportunities. Studies show that the probability of 
creating a successful, new growth business is 10 times greater for innovators pursuing a 
disruptive strategy compared to a sustaining strategy (Christensen, 1997). 
Many of the ideas that end up as sustaining innovations could just as readily have 
been shaped into disruptive business plans, given a distinctly different process and 
managers who understood how to use it. To that end, there are two general strategies for 
turning ideas into plans for disruptive growth businesses: lower-end disruptive innovation, 
which is based on disruption of the prevailing business model or established technology 
from the lower end of the market and new-market innovation, which requires the creation 
of a new market by pulling new customers or users into that market; this can serve as a 
base for disrupting the established firms (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Disruptive Innovation (Christensen & Raynor，2003) 
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Low-end Disruptive Strategy 
A lower-end disruptive innovation is aimed at main stream customers who were 
overshot by established companies, and who do not need the full performance valued by 
customers at the high end of the market. Low-end disruption occurs when the rate at 
which product improvement exceeds the rate at which customers can adopt the new 
performance (Figure 2). The performance of the product, therefore, overshoots the needs 
of certain customer segments. At this point, a disruptive technology may enter the market 
and provide a product which has lower performance than the incumbent but which meets 
the requirements of certain segments, thereby gaining a foothold in the market. In low-
end disruption, the disrupter is focused initially on serving the least profitable customer, 
who is happy with good enough product. This type of customer is not willing to pay more 
for additions or enhancements in product functionality. 
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Also, a disruptive business model is required, which enables the entrant to 
compete profitably while pricing at deep discounts. So once the disrupter has gained 
foothold in this segment, it starts to improve its profit margin. The disrupter needs to 
enter the segment where customer is willing to pay a little more for higher quality, so that 
it can obtain higher profit margins. Therefore the dismptor needs to improve to ensure 
this quality in its products. The incumbent will not do much to retain its share in this not-
so-profitable segment, and will move up-market and focus on its leading and more 
attractive customers. After several such encounters, the incumbent is squeezed into 
smaller markets than it was previously serving. Finally the disruptive innovation may 
eventually meet the demands of the most profitable segment and drives the established 
company out of the market. As Figure 2 shows, the low-end disrupter enters later than the 
incumbant firms, at a lower performance per dollar level, further making established 
firms reluctant to enter the lower end markets. 
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Figure 2. Low-end Disruption (Christensen & Raynor，2003) 
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New-market Disruptive Strategy 
As with a low-end disruption, a new-market disruption can help to create a 
powerful niche for new firms. A new-market disruptive innovation is often aimed at non-
consuming segement of a (potential) market. People's inability to use available products 
or services because they are too expensive or too complicated (Figure 3). The new-
market disruption targets customers who could previously not be served profitably by the 
incumbent. It occurs when a product that is inferior by most measures of performance fits 
a new or emerging market segment. The disruption should target customers who in the 
past have not been able to directly access to the products or services for the lack of 
money or skills. Since the customers that disruptive innovators target are happy with 
technologically straightforward products, successful new-market disruption brings a 
simpler product. Also, by competing against nonconsumption, new-market disruption 
helps customers accomplish things that they are already trying to do but cannot with the 
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available products or services. By doing so, firms can look outside their established 
markets for customers in a disruptive market (Gilbert, 2003). After all, to target potential 
customers who are not buying at all is much easier than stealing customers from an 
entrenched competitor. 
As Figure 3 suggests, the new-market disruption starts from different performance 
measure to capture non-consuming markets. As their performance improves, they 
ulitmiately pull customers out of the original value network into the new one. 
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Overall, the research on disruptive innovation adds a dynamic dimension to 
Porter's work. A cost leadership strategy in Porter's generic strategy yields profitability 
until the higher-cost competitors have exited from the tier in the market, and the 
population of low-cost competitors does not have sufficient capacity of supply what 
customers in a given tier of the market demand. But when the high-cost competitors are 
gone and the entire market demand is supplied by equally low-cost suppliers and once 
low-cost strategy becomes an equal-cost strategy (Christensen, 2000). Also, 
differentiability is destroyed by the mechanism that leads to modularization and 
disintegration. 
2.2.3 Low-end encroachment 
Based on the theory of disruptive innovation, low-end encroachment is further 
developed on the diffusion of low-end markets. If a new product is to encroach on the old 
market, it is a nontrivial new product that has a negative impact on the profitability of the 
old product (Schmidt & Porteus，2000). Namely, there are two way of encroachment: 
high-end encroachment, during which the new product aims at existing high-end 
customers; and low-end encroachment, which occurs when the new product is shunned 
by the best customers but attracts fringe or low-end customers instead as in Christensen's 
formulation. In an extensive empirical study of innovation, Sood and Tellis (2005) found 
that new innovations may attack the existing market from the low or high end, giving 
qualitative support to the low-end and high-end encroachment scenarios. 
Schmidt and Porteus (2000) suggested that a disruptive innovation diffuses 
through the potential market most specifically via a process of low-end encroachment. 
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The term encroachment means that the new product takes sales away from the old 
product over time. This is because of improvements and price reductions in the new 
product that evolve over time. The new product eventually encroaches on the old product 
market. By low-end encroachment, the new product "steals" customers whose demand 
for the traditional dimension of competition is on the lower end. 
Druehl and Schmidt (2005) added that the low-end encroachment might take 
either of the two forms: detached-market type and fringe-market type. The form observed 
in Schmidt and Poreus (2000)，research is the fringe-market type of low-end 
encroachment, which refers to the new product, encroaches on the old product from the 
low end, but after having opened up a new market of customers that were on the fringe of 
the old market, with preferences more similar to existing customers. On the other hand, 
the detached-market form of low-end encroachment refers to the new product first sells to 
customers that are quite "detached" from the old market in terms of customer preferences. 
The product can initially be quite expensive because it sells to a market that is more 
removed and detached in terms of customer willingness-to-pay. As the new technology 
develops, it will still encroach into the old product market from the low end. For example, 
cell phones appear to be a detached-market low end disruptive technology, since they 
were initially very expensive and the technology eventually encroach on the old product 
market from low end. 
Therefore, Druehl and Schmidt extend the work of Christensen and colleagues by 
showing that new-market disruptive innovations are valid but can come in additional 
forms. One form is the low-priced type associated with fringe-market low-end 
encroachment. The second is associated with the detached-market type which can start 
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out as a very expensive product and yet still encroach from the low end. Comparing the 
theories above, the argument that manufacturers in developing countries must strive to 
make high-quality products at low cost — not low-quality products at low cost — in 
order to successfully 
Competition in developed global markets is applied to competing against 
consumption (attacking established markets). As Christensen (1997: pp) put it: 
Customers who already enjoy consuming products of a given functionality 
and consistency rarely jump at the chance to pay less for products that 
aren't as good or as reliable. But the products of disruptive innovators 
need not meet such stringent hurdles because non-consumption is the 
alternative, and customers often prefer something to nothing, even if that 
something is not very good from a high-end market viewpoint. That is not 
to say that disruptive innovations targeted at non-consumption are low in 
quality, just that they have a different (often more modest) package of 
functionality at the outset. 
2.2.4 Summary 
This stream of work generally argues that companies should look for new markets 
in the form of overshot customers that do not want to buy the established products, or 
new customers that hardly considered they had a chance to buy the product. The demands 
previously ignored or existing customers overshot would be the perfect new profits. 
Study shows that about 90 percent of all publicly traded companies have proved 
themselves unable to sustain for more than a few years a growth trajectory that creates 
above average shareholder return (e.g. Zook & Allen, 2001; Foster & Kaplan, 2001; 
Collins, 2001). Although customers in the most demanding tiers of the market may never 
be satisfied with the best product or service available, those in the lower or least 
demanding tiers can be over satisfied with very little. A product which is "good enough" 
can serve these customers' needs. Thus, instead of competing head to head with high-end 
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industrial leaders, companies from developing countries, which has low cost advantage 
but less brand recognition and less advanced technology, should especially consider this 
disruptive strategy. 
2.3 Diversification Strategy 
Usually diversifying or focus strategies are referred not in terms of position but in 
regard to the range of the products. Diversification takes place when the firm expands to 
add products and services. Findings concerning the relationship between diversity and 
performance are still inconsistent. Research done primarily on economies in the west has 
suggested that firms with a higher level of diversification are less profitable than those 
with a lower level of diversification with some exceptions (e.g. Amould, 1969; Gort, 
1962; Hoskisson & Hitt，1994; Markham, 1973). Most studies have been done in Western 
countries or developed countries (e.g., Bettis，1981; Weston et al, 1972; Rumelt, 1982). 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) believe that highly diversified business groups could be more 
suited in most developing countries due to their weak institutional contexts in areas such 
as product, capital, labor markets, regulatory system, and so forth. Because large and 
well-established companies have superior access to capital markets, using their internally 
generated capital to grow existing businesses or to enter new ones, only the largest and 
most diversified groups have the potential to add a good deal of value by imitating the 
functions of several institutions that are present only in advanced economies. Examples 
include the success of large, diversified corporations in developing countries such as 
Indonesia and India and their failure in advanced economies such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom. 
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Based on pioneering research by Chandler (1962) and Ansoff (1965), which 
outlined their general characteristics, a stream of literature has examined diversification 
theory. It classifies firms by the nature of their diversification strategies (e.g. Palepu, 
1985; Montgomery, 1982; Rumelt, 1974，1982; Wrigley, 1970). Two distinct modes of 
diversification have been identified: related and unrelated. Further, a four-part typology 
of diversification strategies was proposed in terms of product l iness ing le product, 
dominant product, related product, and unrelated product (Wrigley, 1970). In particular, 
related product diversification involved expansion into product-markets related to the 
firm's core skill, while unrelated product diversification refers to entry into product-
markets unrelated to a firm's core activity. Further empirical studies suggest that firms 
diversified with related product lines exhibited superior performance (Bettis & Hall, 1982; 
Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Palepu, 1985; Rumelt, 1974; 1982; Suzuki, 1980). 
More specifically, firms utilizing related-constrained diversification strategies had the 
highest average ROE, while those with unrelated diversification strategies were 
associated with lower levels of ROE. Geringer and Beamish (1989) further confirmed 
this finding based on samples of MNEs from the U.S. and Europe. 
Other than the product range, diversifying or focus strategy is also applied in the 
aspect of markets (Kim, Hwang & Burgers, 1989). Research on global diversification 
strategy suggests that the corporate profit performance impact of related and unrelated 
diversification varies contingent upon the extent of a firm's international market 
diversification. Both product and international market are strategic dimensions to predict 
corporate profit performance. International diversification is defined as expansion across 
geographic regions and countries into different locations or markets (Ghoshal, 1987; 
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Leonitades, 1986; Prahalad & Doz，1987). On the one hand, international markets and 
associated operations bring opportunities. On the other hand, they also present increased 
competitive challenges from international competitors (Rugman, 1979; 1981). Empirical 
study shows that firm performance is initially positive but eventually becomes negative 
as international diversification increases (Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim, 1997). 
The phenomenon of highly diversified conglomerates is extensively seen in 
emerging Asian economies such as India and China. The early 1990s have seen a great 
number of Chinese companies diversifying, when the fierce competition in their original 
business sectors drove down the margin. It is now hard to find a Chinese company of 
reasonable size that is not diversified, many being described as jituan gongsi or group 
companies. Many Chinese companies see diversification as the only route to new growth, 
which helps to explain why China is struggling to build home-grown brands (Economist, 
2004). Most domestic businesses prefer to diversify rather than concentrate on a core 
business. Many believe this is a misapplied strategy (Fan, 2006; Kapferer, 2001)，which 
does not solve the problems of the existing business and may even indirectly aggravate 
them by distracting management attention and diverting resources from the core business. 
Almost all multinational companies today are focused to primarily one industry and 
invest capital in core technologies to achieve and sustain dominance. ‘ Chinese firms are 
less likely to invest in proprietary technologies or indigenizing the technology, instead 
they do purchase on possess (Gilboy, 2004). 
The above reviews on previous literature generally suggest a negative relationship 
between a firm's degree of diversification and profitability. There are also a number of 
‘ S e e Kotler Marketing Group. 2002. Is diversification the right strategy for Chinese companies? April, 
available at: www.Kotlermarketing.com 
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empirical studies supporting such findings, but almost all of them done in West context. 
Few studies have done in the context of emerging economies. Indeed, some researchers 
do argue that diversification in certain forms might have advantages for companies from 
developing countries where the institution is relatively weak, since certain diversification 
postures can reduce risk and increase return simultaneously (e.g., Bettis & Mahajan, 
1985). Therefore, there is a need to understand how positioning and scope affects 
corporate performance of Chinese companies which are going global, as well as how 
each form of diversification strategies relates to the performance. 
2.4 Developing Country Multinationals 
The last two decades of century have seen much research on why FDI occurs 
from less developed countries or newly industrialized economies (NIEs). Some 
investigated why firms from less developed countries or NIEs invested in other less 
developed countries or NIEs (Kumar and McLeod, 1981; Lall, 1983; Wells, 1977，1983)， 
and some on cases in which less developed country or NIE firms expanded their 
international activities from their home countries to developed countries (Chen and Chen, 
1998; Lecraw, 1993; Makino et al, 2002; Van Hoesel, 1999). A stream of research on FDI 
by firms based in developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, and Thailand (e.g., Kumar and Mcleod, 1981; Lall, 1984; 
Lecraw, 1977; Ting, 1985; Wells, 1983) concludes that developing country multinationals 
merely competed on price rather than product differentiation, more labor-intensive and 
more flexible technologies than other MNCs (Child & Rodrigues，2005; Lecraw, 1993,). 
These researchers argue that developing country MNCs generally suffer from significant 
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competitive disadvantages such as outdated technology, limited knowledge of overseas 
markets, etc. Especially, they suffer from a lack of internationally known brands or trade 
names, as Wells (1993) indicated. These conclusions are also consistent with the 
argument that MNCs from developing countries need to catch up if they aspire to become 
global players. 
2.4.1 Latecomers' Strategy 
Another factor to consider in unpacking the strategies and motivations of 
indigenous Chinese firms concerns the competitive advantages and disadvantages of 
moving early or late. Much research has shown the advantage of moving early (Chandler, 
2001; Lieberman & Montomery，1988, 1998), more recent empirical work has started to 
challenge that view with evidence that moving late might also confer an advantage, either 
as a follower in innovation (Lieberman et al.，1998; Teece, 1986) or as a new entrant into 
an industry (Christensen, 1997; Henderson, 1993; Henderson & Clark，1990; Schumpeter, 
1934; Tripsas, 1997). This stream of study focuses on the cost advantage of latecomers as 
they can leverage it to start at the bottom of the industry and gradually catch up through 
technology diffusion. Predominately based on the experience in the West (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995), it is complemented by studies of newly industrialized economies 
(NIEs) in Asia, such as Korea (Kim, 1997), Taiwan (Mathews, 1997), and Singapore 
(Amsden & Tschang，2003). 
In their work on "first-mover advantage", Lieberman and Montgomery (1988; 
1998) addressed advantages and disadvantages of moving late in implementing 
innovation. To summarize, first-mover advantages in innovation are always reinforced by 
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the monopoly of superior resources and capabilities (Barney, 1986，1991; Peteraf, 1993; 
Teece, 1986; Wemerfelt, 1984). On the other hand, research also shows followers can 
enjoy certain advantages moving late in implementing an innovation, by free-riding on a 
first-mover's innovation without paying full cost of achieving it, or by avoiding first-
movers' risks on the wrong innovation ( Lieberman et al.，1988, 1998); Miner & Mezias， 
1996; Williamson, 1975) 
Originating from Schumpeter's (1934) work, the studies on the competitive 
advantages of late entry into an industry (Christensen, 1997; Dosi, 1982; Henderson et al., 
1990; Schumpeter, 1934; Teece, 1986; Tushmen & Anderson, 1986) focus on the 
incumbent's inability to manage radical innovations (Arrow, 1962; Christensen, 1997; 
Christensen, 2006; Henderson, 1993; Henderson et al., 1990; Tushman et al , 1986). 
When an innovation technology substitutes and makes obsolete the old technology, this 
innovation is radical and it destroys a firm's existing market power (Arrow, 1962). Some 
researchers also focus on the firm's ability to innovate. When an radical innovation 
requires drastically different knowledge from what the firm currently possesses, the 
incumbent firms fall into the "competency trap" (Levitt & March, 1988) as its routinized 
activities (Nelson et al., 1982) create "structural inertia" ( Hannan & Freeman, 1984)， 
which prevents it from exploring new knowledge. 
On the contrary, research on latecomer innovations from the experience ofNIEs 
in Asia such as South Korea (Kim, 1997; Lee et al., 1988), Taiwan (Amsden & Tschang， 
2003; Breznitz, 2005; Mathews, 1997)，and even comparative studies across economies 
(e.g. Chen & Sewell, 1996; Ernst, 2004; Williamson, 2004) challenge a popular view 
(Vernon, 1966，1979) that latecomer firms can only enter an industry as a low-cost 
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manufacturer after the industry has matured with the emergence of a dominant product 
design and the standardization of the manufacturing process. They argue that latecomers 
firms can leverage technology diffusion (e.g. through "brain circulation" to overcome 
latecomer disadvantages and catch up with industry leader over time. 
The catch-up process is further facilitated by forces such as the increasing 
modularity of knowledge (e.g. in IC design) (Ernst, 2004)，the emergence of new 
business models (Williamson, 2004), unique investment strategies (e.g. due to 
diversification of business) (Mathews et al., 2000)，and extensive government support 
(Zeng & Williamson, 2007). The common theory is that NIEs should catch up with 
industry leaders and benchmark their products on established markets and the developed 
world. This is consistent with the work of Harvard Business School professors Michael 
Porter and Kim Clark, who encourage developing market firms to benchmark best 
product and production practices and select aggressive positions accordingly (Hart & 
Christensen, 2002). It is important to understand that this view differs from theory cited 
earlier on disruptive innovation and low-end encroachment. 
2.4.2 The Bottom of the Pyramid 
Developing countries such as China, India, and Latin America have opened their 
markets to foreign investment since the end of the Cold War. However, the the vast 
growth opportunities of the significant economic transformation has not been fully 
realized. Low-income markets present a prodigious opportunity for MNCs. Countries that 
still do not have the modem infrastructure or products to meet the basic human needs of 
the consumers of these countries and these consumers are an ideal target for developing 
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technologies and products. According to a U.N. World Development Report�，there are 
75 to 100 million affluent Tier 1 consumers at the very top of the world economic 
pyramid from around the world, which is composed of middle- and upper-income people 
in developed countries and the few rich elites from the developing world. In Tiers 2 and 3， 
about two billion poor customers in developed countries and the rising middle classes in 
the developing countries are the targets ofMNC's past emerging-market strategies. There 
are 4 billion people in Tier 4，whose annual per capita income is less then $1,500, which 
is the minimum considered necessary to sustain a decent life (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). 
The four billion people at the bottom of the population pyramid make a multi-
trillion dollar market, taking into account their official aggregate spending power and the 
growing importance of the informal economy among the poor. The reason is most Tier 4 
people living in rural villages, or urban slums and shantytowns, usually do not hold legal 
title or deed to their assets. The quality and quantity of products available for them is 
generally low (Soto, 2000). In view is the tip in of an iceberg. This massive segment of 
the global population remains largely invisible to the corporate sector. At the base of the 
economic pyramid, there are four billion people aspiring to join the market economy for 
the first time. But the majority of large companies seem to be mired in saturated markets 
that have few significant growth opportunities instead of exploiting and reaping the 
profits of selling to the base of the pyramid.. (Hamel, 2000, Foster and Kaplan, 2001). 
Technological advances in the developing world are still under the radar of executives in 
the industrialized economies (Zeng & Williamson，2007). Industries such as 
2 Based on purchasing power parity in U.S. dollar, tier 1 customers have annual per capita income more 
than $20,000, composing for a population of 75-100 million; there are 1.5-1.75 billion people in tiers 1-3， 
with annual per capita income $l,500-$20,000; while tier 4 customers only make an annual per capita 
income less than $1,500, but have a population of 4 billion. 
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telecommunications and consumer electronics can provide profitable disrupting 
approaches. At the same time, disruptive innovation will at first benefit the poorer and 
less-skilled people before gravitating toward higher tiers of the market. Disruptive 
technological approaches can drive up profits and drive out the competition in the 
industries of telecommunications and consumer electronics. Industrial corporations that 
target Tier 4 with disruptive products will make attractive profit and extraordinary growth. 
Developing countries are ideal target markets for disruptive innovations. Although 
it is not a market that allows for the traditional pursuit of high margins, it is the market 
driven by volume and capital efficiency. Unit sales can be extremely high even when 
margins are likely to be low (Prahalad & Hart，2002).The reasons are, first, business 
models forged in low-income markets can be profitably applied in more places than these 
defined in high-income markets. For example, the industries that constituted the engine of 
Japan's economic miracle from the 1960s to 1980s all followed the disruptive strategy. 
Second, as disruptive strategy aim at either replacing the existing product or filling the 
consumer demand for a non-existent product;, these consumers are now quite satisfied to 
have a simpler version of what is available in high-end market. Thus, developing 
countries are often better markets initially for new growth businesses. 
2.4.3 Market Structure in Developing Countries 
Khanna and Palepu (2006) believe that in developing countries, there are four 
distinct markets for products: bottom, local tier, near-global tier and global tier. The 
bottom of the market consists of people who can afford only the least expensive products; 
the local tier customers are satisfied with products of local quality and prices; the near-
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global tier consumers demand products of near-global standard and are willing to pay a 
shade less than global consumers, while the global tier consumers want demand products 
with same attributes and quality in developed countries and are willing to pay global 
prices. 
Multinational corporations typically compete for consumers in the global tier. The 
smartest local companies create a product for the bottom segment and dominate the local 
tier. These companies then move in on the global tier. Usually, these businesses become 
emerging giants. Global businesses tend to avoid head-to-head competition with foreign 
companies. Instead, they focus on niche markets that allow them to capitalize on their 
existing strengths (Khanna & Palepu, 2006). 
2.4.4 Country of Origin Effect 
The Country-of-Origin (COO) effect refers to a reputation or the stereotype. 
Consumers create an association of this stereotype with a specific country (Lin & Kao， 
2004). Extensive empirical research of COO studies support the notion that consumers 
have diverse perceptions about products or services associated with foreign countries, and 
these perceptions affect their behavior based on stereotyped national images of the 
country associated (e.g., Bilkey & Nes, 1982; Cordell, 1922; Papadopoulos & Heslop， 
2002; Tse & Gom，1993). There are studies indicate that consumers exhibit a preference 
for those products from more developed countries (Douglas & Nijssen，2004; Han, 1988; 
Granzin & Olsen, 1998; Shimp & Sharma，1987). Further, a number of research shows 
that country identification has a positive effect on product evaluations for relatively more 
developed countries (Cattin, Jolibert & Lohnes，1982; Darling & Wood, 1989; Gaedeke, 
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1973; Han & Terpstra，1988; Papadopoulos, Heslop & Beracs，1990; Wall & Heslop, 
1986)，while it has a negative impact for other less developed countries (Krishankumar, 
1974; Khanna, 1986). 
This is due to the low recognition and awareness of brands from China (Fan, 2006; 
Gao, Woetzel & Yu, 2003). Specifically, Chinese brands have weak brand equity. 
Although Chinese brands have made evident and impressive progress in terms of 
internationalization, these products are still far less competitive in the global market than 
those produced by China's rivals. The gaps are even widening in some respects (Fan, 
2006). For example, China's domestic TV market has been dominated by the so-called 
Big Four (Changhong, TCL，Konka and Skyworth) for some years, but the combined 
profits of more than 20 domestic TV manufacturers are less than the profits of one 
Japanese manufacturer: Sony (Fan, 2006). Study also shows that in a more developed 
environment such as the United States, businessmen, economists and consumers tend to 
have a low quality perception of brands and products that are imprted from a less 
developed source such as China (Ulgado, Wen, & Lee, 2006). After all, there are only 
eleven Chinese companies ranking in the Fortune 500 list of top global firms by revenue, 
and only two are in the FT 500, ranked by market value. Not one Chinese brand appears 
in Interbrand's top hundred list (Economist, 2004). 
2.4.5 Summary 
In overview, the literatures on developing countries' markets and MNCs, one 
could easily detect that there are both remarkable opportunities in the markets but also 
significant competitive disadvantages for the companies. In the future, MNCs must not 
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overlook the demands that in the past were once ignored or underestimated.in these 
markets.. It is true that these developing country MNCs have disadvantages.such as low 
awareness of brands or products from developing country origins and inabilities of 
innovation due to late-comer's move. These MNCs, using the proper strategy, can 
overcome these disadvantages and enter and succeed in the more developed markets.. 
There is significant literature that suggests that companies or industries from developing 
countries can catch up in terms of technology and benchmark their products or services 
on established and developed markets. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
The above review of the literature generally goes through three streams of 
research on how firms from emerging economies can compete globally. Based on the 
framework of generic strategy (Porter, 1980) and the growth vector (Ansoff, 1987;), the 
disruptive strategy paradigm (Christensen, 1997，2000; Druehl & Schmidt，2005; Khanna 
& Palepu，2006; Kim & Mauborgne, 1999，2000, 2005; Schmidt & Porteus, 2000;Sood & 
Tellis, 2005) argues that there is a large lower end segment in the less developed markets 
in the world. Instead of going through a 'catch-up' process either in technology or in 
market or both, and benchmarking their products and brands on the world stage to disrupt 
the current competition, firms from emerging economics could otherwise enter ignored or 
simply overshot, thus new markets in both developed countries and less developed 
countries. These theories suggest such firms should avoid direct competition with players 
from developed countries. 
The diversifying strategic literatures show debates and conflicts on how the 
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theories work in different contexts (Bettis, 1981; Fan, 2006; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; 
Kapferer, 2001; Khanna & Palepu，1997; Rumelt, 1982; Weston et al, 1972). Therefore, 
the theory needs to be further complemented by being verified under unique institutions. 
Literature on developing markets (Foster & Kaplan，2001; Hamel, 2000; Khanna 
& Palepu, 2006; Prahalad & Hart，2002) suggests the significant potential of demand 
from the bottom of population pyramid and the shocking fact that most players are 
ignoring this. It could be a golden opportunity for companies from developing countries 
since they usually lack the competitive advantages such as technology, brand, distribution 
channels, etc. which their higher-ended counterparts have (Fan, 2006; Gao, Woetzel & Yu, 
2003; Khanna, 1986; Krishankumar, 1974; Ulgado, Wen & Lee，2006). But they could 
process the advantages to compete from lower-end such as low cost and the "good 
enough" features of the product welcomed by customers who up until now have been 
previously ignored.The strategy of developing country MNCs competing globally by 
forcing an entrance into the global market has not been empirically tested and applied by 
Chinese firms yet. As China's economy and exports become even more important among 
both developing countries and developed countries, there is a need to understand what 
Chinese firms are doing strategically, if they are following the prescriptions of theory, and 
what is the resulting performance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAME WORK AND HYPOTHESES 
It is true that many Chinese companies are making acquisitions abroad. Some of these 
firms have been fairly successful in the developing world. However, in the western 
markets, these MNCs are losing money on assets in the second-tier brand market. 
According to contemporary research, both explanations and prescriptions are given, e.g., 
integrating the management of domestic and foreign businesses (Hirt & Orr，2006), 
climbing up the technology ladder to create good brand names (Chen, 2005), leveraging 
manufacturing strength to provide customers from the West with OEM, B2B, export or 
outsourcing services (Yeung, 2005), and so forth. 
The generic strategies framework is useful in that it can be supplemented with the 
disruptive innovation strategies and low-end encroachment perspectives in order to 
provide a more complete framework to unpack and assess the strategies of indigenous 
Chinese firms. 
Porter's generic strategy describes a categorizing scheme consisting of three 
general types of strategies: cost leadership, differentiation, and market segmentation (or 
focus), in two dimensions—market scope and competitive advantage (low cost or 
differentiation). Market segmentation is narrow in scope while both cost leadership and 
differentiation are relatively broad in market scope. On the other hand, the disruptive 
innovation perspective suggests the market positioning dimension, instead of the 
dimension of competitive advantage. In the market positioning dimension, disruptive 
innovation, or low-end encroachment is associated with low cost, while sustaining 
innovation or high-end encroachment is associated with differentiation. So the market 
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segmentation strategy in the generic strategy model is classified by the positioning 
dimension into higher-end and lower-end. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
As the above literature review section on companies from emerging economies 
has suggested, Chinese companies are entering into both less developed countries and 
developed countries markets in both narrow and broad scopes. Previous studies have also 
suggested that there is low awareness of brands for the products from developing 
countries such as China, especially when they encounter customers in the more 
developed markets (e.g., Nolan, 2001; Lin & Kao, 2004; Bilkey & Nes，1982; Tse & 
Gom, 1993; Papadopoulos & Heslop, 2002; Khanna, 1986; Fan, 2006; Gao, Woetzel & 
Yu, 2003; Ulgado, Wen, & Lee，2006). After all, there are only eleven Chinese companies 
ranking in the Fortune 500 list of top global firms, and not one brand figures in 
Interbrand's top hundred list. Globalization of Chinese firms is a very recent phenomenon 
and most Chinese players do not have much experience in doing business abroad. The 
technologies, especially in industries such as automotive, telecommunications are largely 
not ready to meet the standards in the US and Europe. For example, Chinese automakers 
Chery and Geely, China's domestic leaders in the auto industry, have been declaring 
intentions to export into Europe and the US for quite a long time, but they first delayed 
that plan from 2004 to 2007，then to 2008 and beyond. 
Nevertheless, these Chinese Champions also have certain advantages (Zeng & 
Williamson, 2007). For one thing, the "China Price" has concerned the rest of the world 
for decades. The low cost exports in almost every industry forced down wages and prices 
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and drove out competitors in markets everywhere (Engardio & Roberts, 2004). Low cost 
labor matters even in sophisticated industries such as automotive and telecom equipment 
(Lieberthal & Lieberthal, 2003). However, as the low cost of human recourses and raw 
materials are beginning to increase in China,, the evidence is that more and more 
companies are moving their factories from China to other countries such as Vietnam to 
test those locales also. The government, on the other hand, is determined to shift China 
from a low-cost manufacturer to a technology and higher-end industrial leader. It is 
urging some of its biggest companies to sell branded products abroad with favorable 
policies such as removing stringent foreign-exchange controls, guaranteeing loans， 
increasing spending on R&D，etc. 
Many large Chinese companies are thinking about diversifying. It is hard to find a 
Chinese company with reasonable size not diversified. Diversification provides 
organization to a Chinese firm. Many of them see diversification as the only way to grow. 
Research in the West has suggested that the high level of diversification is less profitable 
and more risky (e.g., Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994). But Chinese firms do have their reason to 
pursue the diversifying strategy at home and other developing countries, since the market 
infrastructure there is relatively weak. The lack of publicly available, reliable information 
about market opportunities, and the reputation of diversifying conglomerates as an 
informal but strong signaling device to reduce uncertainty (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 
Peng, 2002; Child, 1994) all help to explain. 
In China, a huge segment of lower-end, but acceptable products, priced at 
unbeatable prices, is emerging (Gadiesh & Vestning, 2006; Wall Street Journal, 2006c). It 
is a large and growing market. In many industries, such as consumer goods and 
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telecommunication equipment, domestic companies have already firmly established 
themselves in the good-enough market segments. For example, Haier, before extering to 
the U.S. and Europe markets, dropped the price by 8% to 12% world-wide for low-to 
mid-end refrigerators, also dominated its home market with products of adequate quality. 
Another example would be the microwave oven maker, Galanz. Before selling abroad, 
Galanz was already the number one brand in domestic market with the biggest market 
share {The Business Review, 2005). 
Like their home market, both developed and developing countries have a sector of 
the "good-enough-market". For the developing markets, which still do not have the 
modem infrastructure or products to meet basic human needs, the quality and quantity of 
products and services available for them are generally modest. Therefore, the demand 
exceeds the supply and the demand is significant. . There are four billion people belong to 
that sector (Prahalad & Hart, 2002; Christensen, 2000). The majority of large companies 
continuously ignore these markets and instead incorrectly compete in saturated markets 
with few growth opportunities. Disruptive innovators correctly compete in the 4 Tier 
markets and achieve significant profits.. Industries such as telecommunications and 
consumer electronics can provide profitable disrupting approaches (Hamel, 2000; Foster 
& Kaplan，2001). Specifically, for firms from emerging economies, entering the market at 
"the bottom of population pyramid", this tier of market will be highly rewarded. 
Although the market margins are likely to be low, the unit sales could be extremely high. 
When firms innovate and focus on economic profit rather than gross margins, profits are 
significant (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). This also means that firms need to target a wider 
market range. These firms need to position at the bottom tier,and the lower level.. 
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For the developed world, there are also customers who were over served by 
industrial leaders and established companies, who do not need the full performance 
valued by customers at the high end of the market (Christensen, 2000; Kim & Mauborgne, 
1999; 2000; Druehl & Schmidt, 2005)，and who are simply ignored (Christensen, 1997; 
2000). 
Therefore, the menu of strategies for Chinese companies could be described in a 
graph with two dimensions adopted from Porter's generic strategies, integrated with 
disruptive innovation and related perspective (see Figure 4): market range (narrow and 
wide), and market position (low-end and high-end). Thus, there are namely four general 
strategy categories: new-market disruptive (low-end and broad), high-end niche (high-
end and narrow), low-end disruptive (low-end and narrow), and differentiation (high-end 
and broad). 
Figure 4. Integrated Model 
Lower-end Higher-end 
Wide Range New-market Disruptive Differentiation 
Narrow Range Low-end Disruptive High-end Niche 
3.2 Hypotheses and Propositions 
Positioning Strategy 
To set a company on a strong, profitable growth trajectory in the face of industry 
conditions, it will not work to benchmark competitors and try to outperform by offering a 
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little more or less, because such a strategy will hardly drive a company to open up 
uncontested market space (Christensen, 1997; Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). The generic 
strategies characterize strategic positions at a simple and broad level. As suggested by 
Porter (1996: 67), a position can be broad or narrow: 
Focused competitors thrive on groups of customers who are over-
served (and hence over-priced) by more broadly targeted competitors, or 
underserved (and hence under-priced)... A broadly targeted competitor... 
serves a wide array of customers, performing a set of activities designed to 
meet their common needs. It ignores or meets only partially the more 
idiosyncratic needs of particular customer groups. 
On the other hand, the lower-end disruptive innovation, which is based on 
disruption of the prevailing business model or established technology from the lower end 
of the market, enables new companies or companies from emerging economics to reorient 
their strategic focus from competitors to alternatives and from customers to non-
customers of the industry. Chinese companies are reportedly attempting low end 
encroachment in many markets (Zeng & Williamson, 2007). In many industries, such as 
consumer goods, construction and telecom equipment, mainland firms have already 
survived multiple domestic consolidations and firmly established themselves in the good-
enough market segment. Companies from emerging markets are recommended to leave 
the competition behind and reorder existing elements in different markets to reconstruct 
them into a new market space where a new level of demand is generated (Christensen, 
1997; 2000; Kim& Mauborgne，1997; 1999). 
Also, the theory of the bottom of population pyramid not only indicates the 
opportunities from lower-end market, especially in the developing countries, but suggests 
the strategies that companies from emerging economies should consider following 
(Prahalad & Hart, 2002; Prahalad, 2006). Specifically, this stream of study argues that 
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since the bottom tier of population pyramid is becoming aware of many products and 
services and is aspiring to share the benefits, it represents a huge untapped market for 
profitable growth, and companies should create products and services for these markets 
to gain profit by filling the vacuum. Contrary to popular assumption, this theory believes 
the bottom tier can be a very profitable market, because even margins are likely to be low, 
unit sales can be extremely high. As a result, profits can be driven by sales volume and 
capital efficiency. Thus, the bottom tier provides the early market pull for disruptive 
technologies. 
Thus it is expected that lower end firms to have a better performance: 
Hypothesis la. Chinese companies active globally that use a low-end 
repositioning strategy will have a better performance than those use a 
higher-end positioning strategy. 
Here, the general performance refers to a company's integrated financial and 
market performance, in terms of financial indicators mostly reflected by return on asset, 
return on equity, and for some firms that are not public listed, reflected by annual sales, 
international sales and market share. 
Return on shareholder's equity (ROE) is viewed as one of the most important 
financial ratios indicating individual company's marketing performance since it measures 
the rate of return on shareholders' equity of the common stock owners. It measures a 
firm's efficiency at generating profits from the net assets, and shows how well a company 
uses investment dollars to generate earnings growth. Thus it is hypothesized that such 
firms will also have a higher return on equity: 
Hypothesis lb. Chinese companies active globally that use a low-end 
positioning strategy will have a higher return on equity performance than 
those use a higher-end positioning strategy. 
51 
Return on asset (ROA) indicates how efficient management is at using its assets 
to generate earnings. Many previous studies have used ROA as a primary performance 
measurement (e.g., McGahan & Porter，1997; Rumelt, 1991). Thus it is hypothesized that 
such firms will also have a higher return on assets: If we can conclude that high 
performance if and only if high ROA, Chinese companies that use a low-end positioning 
strategy will have a higher performance measurement. 
Hypothesis Ic. Chinese companies active globally that use a low-end 
positioning strategy will have a higher return on asset than those use a 
higher-end positioning strategy. 
Market Range 
Studies taken in the western context have often suggested that higher level of 
diversification in both products range and market sectors could be problematic for firms 
(Bettis，1981; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Rumelt, 1982; Weston et al.，1972). However, 
companies from developing economics seem to benefit from the diversifying strategy, 
represented by large, diversified Indonesia and India companies. To avoid the difficulties 
of developing interregional supply chains while securing short-term profits, Chinese 
firms are largely engaging in excessive related or unrelated diversification, making forays 
into ancillary businesses with damaging results. Examples include Haier, from household 
appliances into computers, mobile phones, and televisions; Fangzheng, from computers 
into tea, steel, software, and financial services; and Shougang, from steel into banking, 
auto assembly, and semiconductors. 
Previous studies suggested that companies from developing countries diversify to 
lower the risk since the market infrastructure in these countries is weaker (e.g., Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997). But when these companies enter foreign markets, developing countries or 
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developed countries, they use related diversified strategy, with related product lines and 
markets. For example, Galanz produces both microwaves and air conditioners at home, 
but only sells microwaves abroad. It also relies on a limited number of distributors 
through OEM. Haier is another textbook example of being diversified at home, products 
ranging from white goods, brown goods, to pharmaceutics. But in US, Haier focuses on 
small and cheap refrigerators and wine cooler for the product and the wine lovers and 
college students for the customers, both of them represent much narrower segments than 
in its home China. 
On the other hand, broader scope at international market brings more 
opportunities for firms (Ghoshal, 1987; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). For markets at bottom 
tier of population pyramid, there is great potential for profit. Consumers from that tier 
rapidly become aware of the product and services. Because of the tremendous size of the 
population (four billion people), companies will gain significant profits by earning sales 
volume, even at a lower margin (Prahalad & Hart，2002; Prahalad, 2006).Therefore, this 
thesis also hypothesizes that Chinese companies using a focus strategy aboard will be 
generally more successful. 
Hypothesis 2a: Chinese companies active globally that target a wider 
market range will have a better performance than those that target broader 
product-market scope. 
As previously stated, both ROA and ROE are taken as indicators of company 
performance here. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2b: Chinese companies active globally that target a wider 
market range will have a higher return on equity than those that target 
broader product-market scope. 
And, 
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Hypothesis 2c: Chinese companies active globally that target a wider 
market range will have a higher return on asset than those target broader 
product-market scope. 
Foreign Market Choices 
Developing countries are usually good markets for firms competing at the low end 
(Christensen, 2002; Prahalad, 2004) as there are potentially rapid growing markets 
themselves for technological products. However, most products from developed countries 
can only be enjoyed by high-end customers in these developing countries, which is only a 
small portion of their population, because the majority of the consumer market cannot 
afford these products for many years. In such case, disruptive innovation is one approach 
to explore potential demands of the non-consuming. Developing countries are ideal target 
markets for disruptive innovations. Due to the less accessible information on each 
company's market entry orders within the sample, this issue can not be quantitatively 
tested but will be addressed separately. Therefore this thesis proposed, 
Proposition: Successful Chinese companies going global enter into less 




This study combined the quantitative and qualitative methods in testing and 
extending theory. As theory building in a new research site typically combines multiple 
data collection methods (Eisenhardt, 1989)，research on Chinese global firms— 
essentially a new research site—warrants such design. In this study, the quantitative part 
and qualitative part have distinct but related research objectives. Specifically, the 
quantitative study defines the companies' financial performance and regresses the 
performance on assessment of company's positioning level and market scope. In the 
meanwhile, the qualitative part is to investigate strategic actions (expert rating, case 
analysis). 
4.1 Quantitative Methods 
. The quantitative methods started with the measurement of individual company's 
financial performance. As suggested by John and Kaplan (1987), numbers representing 
revenues, costs and profits in financial statements are the result of estimation, negotiation, 
debate and politics and by nature can produce inaccurate reflections of true cost and 
profit. Nearly all data, numerical or verbal data from a complex reality, are subjective. 
The only way to judge the value of data is by their usefulness in helping us to understand 
conclusions, identify, categories, and make predictions (Carlile & Christensen, 2005). 
Sampling 
The analysis included both state owned enterprises (SOEs: companies with more 
than 50 percent ownership by either central or provincial governments) and privately 
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owned enterprises (POEs: companies with 50 percent or more ownership by private 
investors). The selection criteria derived from a survey conducted by IBM's Institute for 
Business Value, China, and Fudan University's School of Management in Shanghai^, 
employed three "filters": company size, industry characteristics and company 
characteristics - to identify Chinese companies, primarily in manufacturing industries 
with strong globalization potential. 
The first criterion is firm size in terms of annual revenues. Most Chinese 
companies remain small by global standards'^. Among China's top 500 enterprises, only 
290 companies will meet the initial filter of annual revenues over US$1 billion and only 
14 have annual revenues over US$15 billion^. 
The second criterion is the industry characteristics. They are (1), industry size and 
growth (industry size as percentage of GDP); (2)，industry concentrations levels 
(revenues of top companies as percentage of total industry revenue); (3), industry export 
intensity (exports as a percentage of global output); and (4)，government support 
(industrial policies). This filter leaves a total of twelve industries and 124 companies (105 
SOEs and 19 POEs): crude oil and natural gas, consumer electronics, computer products 
and components, telecommunications equipment, automotive, steel, logistics, textiles, 
trading, machinery, food and beverages and petrochemicals. 
The third filter, company characteristics, works as additional criteria: global 
vision (company's globalization strategy), foreign presence (foreign investment activity), 
3 IBM Institute for Business Value, Going global一prospects and challenges for Chinese companies on the 
world stage, 2006 
4 By comparison, the U.S. has over 143 companies with annual revenues exceeding US$15 billions. Source: 
2005 Fortune Global 500 list, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ 
5 Source: China Top 500 Enterprises. China Enterprise Confederation & China Enterprise Directors 
Association, IBM Institute for Business Value China analysis 2005. 
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export volumes, China market position (market share in China) and government support. 
This narrowed the final list for this study to sixty companies, among which 13 POEs and 
47 SOEs. These sixty firms are China's global leaders. 
Of these sixty, twenty companies were chosen as target corporations in four 
industrial sectors: the household appliance and electronics sectors, the telecommunication 
and IT or equipment sectors, IT and electronic devices sector, and automotive and 
automotive parts sectors. The reasons for the selection of the four particular industries are 
two folded. First, these three industries are covering all the global leaders (36 out of 60), 
which are characterized by a more focused and longer-term strategic view that appear to 
be developing the capacity to organize overseas operations systematically. Second, the 
rest of the industries are mostly in energy, steel and petrochemicals. Companies in such 
industries mainly follow the "merger and acquisition" way of globalization, with the 
primary purpose of securing raw material supplies to power the country's consistently 
rapid economic growth rather than to compete in international markets (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005). Therefore the material processing enterprises are excluded even though 
they are also investing heavily abroad. 
Instrument 
A panel of experts was used to develop normative recommendations regarding the 
appropriate content of the integrated model. They rated the companies' strategies to 
create a particular scenario for each of the twenty Chinese firms chosen for the 
quantitative method of this study. These scenarios were based on descriptions from 
academic business journals, following the method Dess et al (1984) did to demonstrate 
the viability and usefulness of categorizing firms' strategies. The use of a panel of experts 
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in strategy research also follows the recommendations of Harrigan (1983) for the 
refinement and corroboration of investigator inferences developed from field research. 
Study shows that expert judges will not show well-known biases such as leniency and 
halo because they tend to cluster variables in the same way when identifying and 
organizing cues, and the intrajudge reliability will be high because experts tend to weigh 
combine information in similar ways (Einhom, 1974; Green & Swets，1966; Sawyer, 
1966). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the variables being measured should be 
representative. The panel is consisted of 4 academicians selected on the basis of their 
experience and expertise in the field of strategic management. Each panel member was 
asked to review Porter (1980)'s chapter on "Generic Competitive Strategies" and 
Christensen (1997)'s chapter on "Disruptive innovation". Then they were asked to read 
the three documents on each company, as written document is believed to be an important 
source of information for qualitative studies (Geer, Borglund & Frostenson, 2004). The 
documents were selected from business and economic journals, e.g. the Wall Street 
Journal, Business Week and several English language Chinese sources within recent 5 
years, that is, from the year 2001 to the year 2005. After that, they were asked to 
complete a questionnaire on each company, rating each firm from low to high on the 
same 14 competitive positioning criteria with a 5-point scale, which have a theoretical 
association with competitive strategy. Most of the competitive strategic variables 
(elements or competitive methods) have been cited as contributing to competitive 
strategy in Porter's generic strategy study and the PIMS program (Buzzell and Gale, 
1987). In the empirical literature on competitive strategy, there is a large degree of 
consistency in variables across studies based on the PIMS data (Campbell, 2000), and 
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many others used the set of strategy elements developed by Dess and Davis (1984), 
which are closely comparable to the PIMS measures. Appendix 2 describes the contents 
of the 14 standardized variables which describe competitive strategies. Among these 14 
variables, 6 of them describe firms' position strategies, while the rest 8 relate to firms' 
market range^ (e.g. Kotha & Vadlamani，1995; Dess & Davis，1984). 
Strategy Assessment 
After creating the 20 firm strategy scenarios, a second group was asked to look at 
each scenario and rate each of the 20 firms' strategy on two key criteria: position level 
and market range. This is similar to a policy-capturing instrument, except that 
assessments not decision policies are being gathered. It is a regression-based decision-
capturing methodology in which participants are asked to make assessment in response to 
a series of scenarios presented by the researcher (Aiman-Smith, Scullen & Barr，2002; 
Sherer, Schwab, & Heneman，1987; Viswesvaran and Barrick, 1992). 
One of the strengths of policy-capturing is that by presenting respondents with 
appropriately sampled stimuli, the researchers can focus on particular stimuli. Because 
these stimuli are repeated, the reliability of the data could be assessed. Besides, it 
provides a relatively high degree of control over confounding (Aiman-Smith, Scullen & 
Barr, 2002; Carroll & Johnson, 1990; McGrath, 1982). Also, policy-capturing studies 
provide a reasonable level of precision of measurement (Carroll & Johnson, 1990; 
6 The variables which relate to position level are: 1)，premium pricing product, 2)，product quality control, 
3)，emphasis on R&D for new products (features), 4), brand identification, 5), emphasis on process 
innovation, and 6), cost reduction. The eight variables related to market range arel), broad range of 
products, 2), product targeted primary at one type customer, 3), customer service, 4)，serving special 
markets, 5), marketing innovation, 6)，advertising propensity, 7), emphasis on niche markets, and 8), 
emphasize smaller and specialty distributions. 
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McGrath, 1982). 
For this thesis, scenarios for each of the sample companies were created based on 
the ratings by the experts. Presented with the 14 strategic criteria (competition variables), 
respondents were asked to rate two strategic options for each of the 20 companies: 
position level and market scope. The 20 scenarios were developed by randomly assigning 
each of the 14 criteria a number on a scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high), but the order 
is consistent for all the 20 scenarios. The reason for the randomization is to limit the 
potential for collinearity between the criteria. 
62 MBA students who are taking or have taken strategy class were asked to 
evaluate the same 20 scenarios. Thus the majority of analyses were conducted technically 
creating 1240 separate observations (62 participants X 20 scenarios). The assumption that 
each case represents an independent observation has previously been accepted (e.g., Hitt 
& Middlemist, 1979; Hitt & Tyler，1991). These respondents were presented with 
scenarios in alphabetic order, such as 01，02.. .，but no identification of the companies. 
They were also asked to review the literature on generic strategies and disruptive 
strategies. They rated both the positioning level and market range of each company on a 
seven-point Likert scale raging from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). The numbers reported 
for these two questions were added together to create the dependent variables. 
Measures 
Dependent Variables 
The financial performances were measured by each company's average ROA 
(return on asset) from the year 2001 to the year 2005 and average ROE (return on 
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shareholders' equity) from the year 2002 to the year 2005. Based on these two financial 
indicators, a general performance variable was created as the third dependent variable, 
which was dummy- coded for "successful" and "less successful" performance. 
Most previous studies have used ROA as a primary performance measurement 
(e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991). Also, ROE is viewed as one of the most 
important financial ratios since it measures the rate of return on shareholders' equity of 
the common stock owners. It measures a firm's efficiency at generating profits from the 
net assets, and shows how well a company uses investment dollars to generate earnings 
growth. As with many financial ratios, ROE is best used to compare companies in the 
same industry. 
Independent Variables 
To test the hypotheses, each company's position level and market range were 
measured using the method of policy capturing on a seven-point Likert scale raging from 
1 (very low) to 7 (very high). The numbers reported for these two questions were added 
together to create the dependent variables. 
Control Variables 
Industry. It is possible that the industry in which the firm operates impacted its 
performance. The sample was subdivided into four different industrial sectors: 
telecommunications, IT and electronic, automotive, and household appliance 
manufacturing industry. These four industries were dummy- coded. 
Firm Size. Past research showed that firm size influences the firm's capacity and 
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its market power, thus its decision to make marketing strategies. Especially in Asia, firms 
with larger size are more likely to pursue diversifying strategies. Firm size was measured 
by the annual revenue of the companies. 
The analytical methods used in this thesis were logistic regression and multiple 
regressions. To test Hypotheses la and 2 a, because the dependent variable is dummy 
coded (successful and less successful), logistic regression was performed to examine the 
relationship between firms' general performance and their strategies. Multiple regressions 
were performed to test Hypotheses lb, Ic, 2b and 2c. 
4.2 Qualitative Methods 
Due to the lack of PIMS type data of the twenty sample companies in corporate 
level and business level and the lack of separation of firm performance domestically and 
internationally, the quantitative methods were not sufficiently able to reflect the relation 
between firm strategies and performance. Therefore, in this study, qualitative method was 
employed to supplement the quantitative analysis and illustrate the Chinese firms' 
strategies. Qualitative investigation is believed to be helpful in such situations (Daft & 
Lewin, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, case studies have been regarded a useful 
method when the area of research is relatively less known (Chauri & Gronhaug, 2002; 
Stake, 1994)，and it is a preferred approach when "how" or "why" questions also need to 
be answered.. This is the case when the researcher has little control over events and when 
the focus in on a current phenomenon in a real-life context (Yin, 1994). 
Therefore, case analysis was the most precise supplemental method used to draw 
conclusions on Chinese firms pioneering markets in foreign countries. In comparative 
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case studies, the same questions in a number of organizations were studied, and these 
cases were compared with each other to draw conclusions. To compare (replicate) the 
phenomenon in a systematic way, different dimensions of the research issues could be 
explored (Ghauri, 1983; 2004). In the case analysis, four companies which use different 
positioning strategies were selected to conduct comparative case studies based on various 




This chapter first presents the results of the quantitative study and then the 
findings of the qualitative study. 
5.1 Quantitative Results 
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Using the above mentioned sample selection criteria, 20 companies in four 
industries were identified as companies with globalization potential. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the industrial sectors and annual revenue in 2005 indicating the 
firm size. Table 2 presents average return on asset (ROA) from the year 2001 to 2005. 
Table 3 presents the average return on equity (ROE) from the year 2002 to 2005. As 
mentioned in previous chapter, both ROA and ROE were measured as indicators for 
individual company's financial performance. 
Table 1 illustrates that the biggest sized companies with global potential are more 
likely to be SOEs, e.g., Haier, TCL, SAIC, though there is still some confusion about the 
ownership of Lenovo. There is no particular pattern suggesting the relationship between 
firm size and industry type, as there are both big and smaller firms in each industrial 
sector. 
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Table l.Firm Size Measured by Annual Revenue (Millions of U.S. dollars) 
Company Name 2005 Annual Revenue Industry 
1 Haier 12202 Household appliance 
2 SAIC 12100 Automotive 
3 BOE 5454 Telecommunication 
4 TCL 5091 Household appliance 
5 Lenovo 5069 IT and electronic 
6 Midea 3939 Household appliance 
7 Huawei 3812 Telecommunication 
8 Panda 3386 Household appliance 
9 Hisense 3300 Household appliance 
10 Brilliance 2739 Automotive 
11 ZTE 2566 Telecommunication 
12 Wanxiang 2522 Automotive 
13 Changhong 1680 Household appliance 
14 Konka 1616 Household appliance 
15 Galanz 1325 Household appliance 
16 Skyworth 1295 Household appliance 
17 Bird 1239 IT and electronic 
18 Lifan 823 Automotive 
19 Geely 624 Automotive 
2 0 Chery ^ Automotive 
ROA is usually a useful number for comparing competing companies in the same 
industry as the number will vary widely across different industries. It is believed that 
companies which require large initial investments will generally have lower return on 
assets. Average ROA was calculated for each company within the sample. Table 2 
suggests that either firm size or industrial type affects these companies' average ROA?. 
So does ROE, which is shown by Table 3. Furthermore, the rankings by average ROA 
and ROE are in the similar order. Table 4 summarizes the above information of the 20 
sample firms. 
7 Simple regression is not performed here because of the small simple size (16 and 17). 
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Table 2. Ranking by Average ROA (2001-2005)® 
Ranking Company Name Average ROA Industry 
1 Huawei 22.2 Telecommunication 
2 ZTE 16.27 Telecommunication 
3 Lenovo 15.3 IT and electronic 
4 SAIC 12.08 Auto 
5 Geely 11.6 Auto 
6 Haier 8.6 Household appliance 
7 Wanxiang 8.27 Auto 
8 Midea 6.73 Household appliance 
9 Panda 6.16 Household appliance 
10 TCL 5.16 Household appliance 
11 Bird 4.72 IT and electronic 
12 Skyworth 4.2 Household appliance 
13 BOE 3.03 Telecommunication 
14 Hisense 1.36 Household appliance 
15 Konka -0.53 Household appliance 
16 Changhong -3 Household appliance 
17 Brilliance -6.66 Auto 
Table 3. Ranking by Average ROE (2002-2005)' 
Ranking Company Name Average ROE Industry 
1 Lenovo 25.93 IT and electronic 
2 TCL 14.65 Household appliance 
3 SAIC 13.82 Auto 
4 ZTE 12.75 Telecommunication 
5 Geely 12.33 Auto 
6 Midea 9.71 Household appliance 
7 Wanxiang 9.57 Auto 
8 Skyworth 9.48 Household appliance 
9 Panda 7.29 Household appliance 
10 Haier 5.55 Household appliance 
11 Bird 4.29 IT and electronic 
12 Konka 2.80 Household appliance 
13 Hisense 2.45 Household appliance 
14 Changhong 0.73 Household appliance 
15 BOE -5.83 Telecommunication 
16 Brilliance -40.09 Auto 
8 Three companies (Galanz, Chery and Lifan are not included in this ranking. The ROA data is not available 
because four of these 20 companies are not listed (the above three and Huawei, but Huawei’s ROA was 
released in its annual report) 
9 Same reason as listed for Table2, Huawei, Galanz, Chery and Lifan's ROE data is not available. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms 
Company , Average Average Position Market , , ^ XT Annual „ „ „ ^ „ „ ° � „ Industry Name Revenue ROE ROA Score Range � 
Haier 12202 5.55 8.60 3.44 3.77 Household appliance 
SAIC 12100 13.82 12.08 5.21 5.52 Automotive 
BOE 5454 -5.83 3.03 2.52 2.26 Telecommunication 
TCL 5091 14.65 5.16 5.37 4.87 Household appliance 
Lenovo 5069 25.93 15.30 5.37 5.60 IT and electronic 
Midea 3939 9.71 6.73 4.22 5.37 Household appliance 
Huawei 3812 n.a. 22.20 4.80 4.73 Telecommunication 
Panda 3386 7.29 6.16 4.05 5.44 Household appliance 
Hisense 3300 2.45 1.36 3.55 5.00 Household appliance 
Brilliance 2739 -40.09 -6.66 5.73 2.51 Automotive 
ZTE 2566 12.75 16.27 5.26 5.39 Telecommunication 
Wanxiang 2522 9.57 8.27 2.08 2.47 Automotive 
Changhong 1680 0.73 -3.00 2.39 3.15 Household appliance 
Konka 1616 2.80 -.53 2.47 3.30 Household appliance 
Galanz 1325 n.a. n.a. 2.05 2.32 Household appliance 
Skyworth 1295 9.48 4.20 2.27 2.63 Household appliance 
Bird 1239 4.29 4.72 1.77 1.90 IT and electronic 
Lifan 823 n.a. n.a. 2.35 2.56 Automotive 
Geely 624 12.33 11.60 2.30 2.63 Automotive 
Chery ^ n.a. 2.13 1.95 Automotive 
Calculating the average ROA (6.79) and ROE (5.34) for the companies listed, an 
almost same order was presented. Specifically, both Table 2 and Table 3 suggest that 
companies like Huawei, ZTE, Haier, SAIC and Geely have better performance, albeit in 
different firm sizes. Galanz's two financial indicators were not reported since it is not a 
listed company yet. But judging from the sources based on business and economic 
journal and its company website, Galanz is a rather successful in terms of global 
performance, both reflected by its annual sales in 2006 being RMB 13 billion, and its 40 
percent global market share in microwave ovens. For Wanxiang in auto part industry and 
TCL in household appliance industry respectively, their financial performance in terms of 
ROA and ROE are slightly above general and industrial average levels. Thus, mainly 
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based on the average ROA and ROE, a general performance category defined by 
successful and less successful performance was demonstrated in Table 4. 
Table 5. General Performance Category'" 
Successful Firms Less Successful Firms 
Wanxiang Lifan 
Geely Chery 
Galanz Ningbo Bird 
Huawei Skyworth 
Lenovo Konka 
ZTE Brilliance Auto 
SAIC Hisense 
Haier Midea 
TCL Panda Electronics 
BOE 
Sichuan Changhong 
5.1.2. Tests of Hypotheses 
General Performance 
Table 5 presents the results of logistic regression models testing Hypotheses la 
and 2a. Logistic regression was used due to the binary dependent variable. 
Hypothesis la predicted that the general performance of a Chinese company 
which goes global is better when it pursues a lower-end positioning strategy. The result 
supports the first hypothesis (/?=-. 13, p<0.01), indicating a negative relationship between 
company's position level and general performance. The results show that when a Chinese 
company enters foreign markets, it is likely to have better performance if it disrupts the 
market from lower end, instead of competing with higher end global champions head to 
head. Hypothesis 2a predicted that the general performance of such company is better if it 
Basically, the firms with higher ROA and ROE than average were defined as successful firms, the rest 
being less successful firms. The performances of the firms without ROA and ROE data were examined 
based on qualitative data, e.g., major business and economics journal and company websites, etc. 
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targets narrower scope of market/customer. The results of Model 2, also supported what 
was hypothesized, showing a positive relationship between performance and a wider 
market range (J3 = 27, p<.01). In other words, results show that when a Chinese company 
targets wider market range or (and) sells diversified products, it is likely to have better 
general performance. Nevertheless, both the position level and market range significantly 
affect a company's general performance. 
Table 6. Results of Logistic Regression Analysis ^ 
Variables 




Position Level -.13** 
Market range .27* 
n 1240 
df 7 
Percentage of cases correctly classified 81.8 
a Logistic coefficients are reported, 
b Four industries were coded as three dummies 
*p<.01 **p<.001 
Specific Financial Performance 
A further examination of the relations between strategies companies choose and 
their specific financial performances in terms of ROA and ROE was conducted by 
multiple regression. Table 6 illustrates the results of multiple regression analysis testing 
Hypothesis lb and 2b". 
‘‘The average ratings for each firm's position level and market range were calculated, for the purpose of 
conducting the firm level regression. The results also showed a negative relation between position level 
and ROE (/3=-.785，R^=.542, not significant), and a positive relation between market range and ROE 
(1(3=1.045, R2=.542, not significant). 
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Table 7. Results of Regression Analysis on ROE a 
Variables 
a Standardized 
coefficients (Betas) Firm size .13* are reported. 
N=1240 Auto -.00 
*p<.01 Appliance .17 **p<.001 
Telecom .10** 
Position level -.33** 




Adjusted R" .27 
This model depicts the main effects of firms' position level and market range on 
average ROE. Both position level and market range were found to be related to firms' 
ROE, with a significant effect (/?=-.33,/7<.001, and ^=50,p<.00\, AR2=.16，AF=29.82, 
/7<.001). Hypothesis lb predicted that Chinese companies active globally that have a 
lower position lower will have a higher ROE. The results of Model 2 supported this 
hypothesis. Hypothesis 2b predicted that these firms will have a higher ROE when they 
aim narrower market scope. Results also supported this hypothesis {^=.50, p<.00l), 
showing a significant positive relationship between market range and ROE. Besides, this 
model also shows that firm size is significantly linked to company ROE. The bigger the 
size, the higher average ROE the company is likely to have. Table 7 illustrates the results 
of regression analysis testing Hypothesis Ic, and 2c . 
12 Same as the testing of Hlb and H2b, firm level regression was performed here. Results reported negative 
relation between position level and ROA, but positive relation between market range and ROA (|3 =-.095, 
and 0 = 552, R^=.238, not significant). 
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Table 8. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis on ROA a 
Variables 




Position level -.10** 




Adjusted R" .53 
a Standardized coefficients (Betas) are reported. N=1240 
**p<.001 
This model depicts the main effects of firms’ position level and market range on 
ROA. Both position level and market range were found to be related to firms' ROA, with 
a significant effect {(3 =-.10，/?<.001，and/5 =.38,j5<.001, AR2=.10, AF=111.17，/7<.001). 
Hypothesis Ic predicted that Chinese companies active globally that position lower will 
have a higher ROA. Therefore, the results of Model 2 supported this hypothesis. Same as 
Hypothesis 2c，results suggested that these firms will have a higher ROA when they aim 
wider market range or processes related diversified product lines (fi =.38,/?<.001). This 
model also indicates firm size is positively relates to average ROA of a company. 
In summary, the results of the analysis supported the hypotheses. The findings 
show that lower-end positioning strategy of Chinese companies relates to better general 
performance, and better financial performance in terms of average ROE and ROA. All 
the hypotheses on the negative relationship between position level and company 
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performance (Hypotheses la, lb, and Ic) were significantly supported. At the same time, 
results demonstrate a positive relation between wider market range/customers and general 
performance as well as the financial performance in terms of ROE and ROA of these 
Chinese companies which are going global. 
5.2 Qualitative Results 
To supplement the previous study and to clearly separate the firms' international 
performance from domestic performance and limit the previous research, a qualitative 
investigation was also conducted to provide rich insight and detail to better interpret the 
results drawn from the quantitative analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Daft & Lewin, 1990; 
Barker & Duhaime, 1997). Cases are used to provide insight into an issue in business 
studies, especially when the area of research is relatively less known (Ghuari, 2004). 
Compensating the less accessible data of the sample companies, case studies of four 
companies were conducted. Table 8 illustrates the main characteristics of these four 
companies. 
In this section, the same questions in the four companies which belong to four 
different industries are studied and compared in order to draw conclusions. The purpose 
was to compare the phenomenon in a systematic way, explore different dimensions of 
their strategies and examine different levels of the strategy variables. Every case served a 
particular purpose. Specifically, the four companies studied belong to four different 
industries respectively. In addition, they also pursue contrasting strategies, while all have 
obtained good performance so far. The purpose of the case analysis is to further 
investigate into a specific company in terms of its position level, market range, and order 
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of foreign market entry, and explain the relation between these strategies and firm 
performance. 
Table 9. Main Characters of Four Companies 
Galanz Haier Huawei Geely 
Main Microwave Refrigerators, Switches and routers Passenger 
Products ovens appliances for networks cars 
Reveune 
2005 n.a. 12202 3812 624 
(US$ mns) 
Average 
ROA n.a. 8.6 22.2 11.6 
(2001-2005) 
Target D^^loping uSAand 160 Mostly Developing Developing 
Markets . P countries countries Countries countries 
Market entry OEM FBI, full scale Original globalize Export operations 
5.2.1 Haier Group 
According to the October 2003 issue of the Harvard Business Review, Haier 
Group is one of the five Chinese "National Brands to Watch." In 1984，when Haier ’s 
CEO Zhang Ruimin took over the company from a government official, it had total assets 
of $300,000, a net loss of$178,000, sales revenues of $421,000, and 600 workers. For the 
next 20 years, Haier Group posted an average annual groth rate of 68% and hit 12.1 
billion in global sales in 2004.. The firm now manufactures a wide range of household 
electrical appliances in 96 categories with 15,100 specifications, exports products to more 
than 160 countries, and has established 58,800 sales outlets globally (Strategic Finance, 
2006). 
From 1984 to 1991，the company created and built Haier-brand products and set 
up a quality assurance system. The thinking shifted from volume as the priority of quality 
and brand recognition being the priorities. From 1991 to 1998，Haier pursued an 
73 
expansion or diversification strategy within China. Since the firm based itself on quality 
instead of quantity, it decided that if someone bought a Haier Group refrigerator, they 
might like to buy something else from the firm. The business was developed primarily 
through mergers and acquisitions to cover all kinds of household electronic appliances 
and electronic consumer goods including refrigerators, washing machines, air-
conditioners, freezers, color TVs, instead of just one product. At this time it also focused 
on building great distribution channels all over China and improving product 
development speed and quality. 
After being listed in the world's top 500 enterprises and becoming a brand known 
worldwide, Haier began its "second start-up".The stereo-typical objective of Chinese 
enterprise had been to export and earn foreign currency. Since 1998，，Haier spearheaded a 
new and profitable objective. Haier established a brand reputation overseas (Gao, 
Woetzel & Wu，2003). The company firstly penetrated difficult markets such as the 
United States and Europe and then went to easier markets. This strategy called for Haier 
to enter those markets with the strictest entry standards first before entering other markets. 
Haier chose the German market as the first target in 1992. In comparison with German-
made refrigerators, German consumers found Haier，s products to be better. From then on, 
Haier，s refrigerators have gained a good reputation in the German market. Guided by this 
strategy, Haier accelerated the pace of its entry into the European and American markets 
and later Southeast Asian countries, Middle Eastern countries, and India. 
In 2000，the firm opened a $35 million refrigerator factory in Camden, South 
Carolina, and started selling products through Wal-Mart and many other national and 
regional chains. In 2002, Haier opened its American headquarters in New York City. The 
74 
firm's international promotion framework encompasses global networks for design, 
production, distribution, and after-sales services. It sells its products in 12 out of 15 
European chain supermarkets and 10 of America's chain stores. And it has design, 
production, and sales facilities in the United States and some European countries with 
local employees primarily running them (Lin, 2005). 
In 2002, Haier sold nearly half of the compact refrigerators that were sold in the 
United States. Most users of compact refrigerators are college students, whom usually 
have very small apartments and also use computers. Haier introduced a new compact 
refrigerator with two wooden flaps on the sides that can be folded back down when you 
need the extra space in the apartment. Consumers appreciated the features. Large 
manufacturers like GE and Whirlpool unwisely did not pay attention to such minor 
details. It also pioneered electric wine cellars—those inexpensive stand-alone cabinets for 
wine lovers who lack drafty chateaux in which to store their treasures. By finding such 
niches, Haier racked up U.S. sales of about $200 million in 2001. 
Innovation that sells products is critical for a new brand, like Haier, to win 
credibility with retailers. Haier made it by aiming at niche market like designing compact 
refrigerators with locks for the student market and the wine cellars for wine lovers. It also 
aimed at underserved markets一assisted-living residences, such as those want reliability 
in small-sized units. This had helped Haier win shelf space in Wal-Mart, Lowe's, and 
Best Buy in U.S. 
Strategies 
The scenario rated by experts suggested that going abroad, Haier sells a not-so-
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broad range of products (average), targets not-so-broad customers and geographic 
markets (average), and emphasizes on niche markets (moderately high). Policy capturing 
survey showed relatively low ratings for both the position and market range (3.44 out of 7 
for position score and 3.77 out of 7 for target score). The following paragraphs are talking 
about the positioning and market range in details. 
Positioning Strategy 
Overseas, Haier does not challenge its bigger opponents head-on. Instead, it 
focuses on segments that the market leaders have vacated or are not interested in serving 
because profit margins or volumes are low. In other words, Haier pursues a new-market 
disruptive strategy. It uses its experiences in adapting technologies and features to meet 
the price points of cost-conscious Chinese buyers to develop products for those segments. 
By the early 1990s the company battled Whirlpool, Electrolux, Siemens, and Matsushita 
to become the leader in China's market for home appliances. When it entered the U.S. 
refrigerator market in 1994, Haier sidestepped market leaders like GE and Whirlpool. For 
five years, it focused on selling only compact refrigerators—units smaller than 180 
liters一that could be used as minibars in hotel rooms or that students could squeeze into 
dorm rooms (Zeng & Williamson，2003). The incumbent leaders had dismissed these 
market segments as peripheral, but they proved to be quite profitable for Haier, which 
proceeded to capture 50% of the mini-fridge market. Haier's customers did not demand 
groundbreaking innovations or state-of-the-art technologies, instead, they only wanted 
products that were reliable, cheap and that met their basic needs. Haier delivers such 
products, which allows it to surprise its rivals who are more concerned about 
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breakthrough innovations. 
Related Diversifying Strategy 
In home market, Haier declared that diversification is one of its main elements of 
its long-term growth strategy. The business was developed primarily through mergers and 
acquisitions to cover all kinds of household electronic appliances and electronic 
consumer goods included refrigerators, washing machines, air-conditioners, freezers, 
color TVs, instead of just one product. It is now manufacturing more than 15,000 product 
items in 96 categories, ranging from white and brown goods, consumer electronics, to 
totally unrelated businesses such as pharmaceuticals, logistics, catering and financial 
services. Unsurprisingly, most of the unrelated diversification ventures ended in failure 
after modest initial success. 
But Haier targets much narrower scope in the foreign markets. It sold nearly half 
of compact refrigerators in the United States, most users of which are college students, 
living in small apartments. Therefore, it avoided the mass market in which consumers 
like the features of large manufacturers like GE and Whirlpool. It also aimed at 
underserved markets一assisted-living residences,. Another niche market is users of 
electric wine cellars—inexpensive stand-alone cabinets for wine lovers. 
Order of Market Entry 
Haier's global market entry is first to penetrate developed markets such as the 
United States and Europe and then go to developing markets. Haier chose the German 
market as the first target in 1992. Following that strategy,，Haier accelerated the pace of 
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its entry into the European and American markets and later Southeast Asian countries, 
Middle Eastern countries, and India. 
Performance 
Haier’s annual revenue in 2005 reached $ 12,202 million, its average ROA from 
the year 2001 to year 2005 being 8.6%, and average ROE from the year 2002 to year 
2005 5.55%. Comparing to other companies within this thesis' sample, Haier，s overall 
financial performance could only be mediocre. However, the 2003 Harvard Business 
Review referred Haier Group as one of the five Chinese "National Brands to Watch." Its 
products have exported to more than 160 countries, and it has established 58,800 sales 
outlets globally. Most important, Haier followed the original globalization approach, 
selling its product under its own brand, rather than taking the OEM route, as most of 
other household appliance makers did. 
Summary 
Entering international markets, Haier pursues a new-market disruptive strategy, 
exploring new demands and focusing on that niche market. By capturing the market its 
mainstream competitors do not bother to enter, Haier increased its sales significantly and 
also built up its own brand name. Even it pursues an over diversifying strategy at home 
market, in foreign markets, Haier uses a related diversifying strategy, selling related 
products. For the order of market entry, contrary to most of Chinese companies, Haier 
penetrated developed markets first, and later went into developing and easier markets. 
The overall performance of this company is distinguished as exemplified by its sales 
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revenues has reached China's top 5 at $ 12, 202 million. Exports have ranked high 
compared to other global exporters and awareness of brand name has continued to rise for 
Haier. 
5.2.1 Galanz 
Guangdong Galanz Enterprise Group, the world's biggest maker of microwave 
ovens with annual sales of RMB 13 billion, builds 40 percent of the world's microwave 
ovens and dominates its home market in China. Its products have reached about 200 
countries and regions^ 
Until 1992，Galanz was only a textile and garment manufacturer. From 1991 to 
1992，Galanz spent a whole year decidng on the new industry that it was going to enter. 
Microwaves would hardly seem to be a logical choice: most potential consumers in 
developed markets had microwave ovens, and the market was mature and shrinking. At 
that time, China's microwave oven industry had just started, and the domestic market was 
almost monopolized by foreign brands, such as Whirlpool and LG. 
Galanz reached non-consumers domestically first. At that time, only 2 percent of 
all Chinese households owned a microwave oven. Most families just did not have 
kitchens large enough to accommodate microwave ovens built with Western kitchens in 
mind. Galanz's founder Qingde Liang decided to develop a simple, energy-efficient 
microwave that was small and cheap enough for the average Chinese family to afford. 
Galanz started small. In 1993, it produced 10 thousand microwave ovens for 
testing sales. The domestic market share was a meager 2 percent in that year. But sales 
steadily increased. Liang took advantage of economies of scale to reduce the product's 
Source: http://www.galanz.com/AboutGalanz/introduction.aspx 
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price and reach a growing number of Chinese consumers. In January 1996, sales volume 
reached 250 thousand units and became Number One brand in the domestic market with 
25.1% market share, which increased to 50% in six months. In May 1998, the market 
share in China reached its all time high of 73.5%. In December 1998, Galanz microwave 
oven annual output reached 4 million, which made Galanz the world's single largest 
microwave oven production facility. In June 2000, Galanz's intangible assets surpassed 
R M B ¥ 1 0 billion (The Business Review, 2005). In less than 10 years, Galanz created a 
famous brand in the Chinese home appliance market, with its exceptional growth being 
called "Galanz phenomenon" or "Galanz model". 
In 2000，while microwave oven sales were still growing stably, Galanz announced 
it would enter air-conditioner and other small home electric appliances, such as rice-
cooker and electric fans. It began trying to replicate its success by disrupting the home air 
conditioning industry with a low-end product. In September 2000, Galanz invested RMB 
2 billion in air conditioning industry. Again, it built a simple, low-cost, energy-efficient 
product that was good enough to cool the small homes and apartments in which most 
Chinese lives. In 2001，Galanz sold 500 thousand air-conditioners and annual production 
volume of air-conditioner reached 3 million in 2002. By 2002, its global market share 
was 35 percent. In 2003, over 1.5 million air-conditioners were sold, out of which 80 
thousand were exported'"^. 
Strategies 
The scenario rated by experts suggested the following: by going abroad, the 
14 A wave of inspiration. WorldSources Online. Lanham: September 22, 2004. URL: 
http// www.thestandard.com/ 
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breadth, of the product range Galanz sells is very low. It targets primary at one type of 
customer and special geographic markets, and emphasizes niche markets and specialty 
distribution. Policy capturing survey showed very low ratings for both the position and 
market range (2.05 out of 7 for position score and 2.32 out of 7 for target score) for a 
focus-low cost position. The following paragraphs are talking about the positioning and 
market range in details. 
Positioning Strategy 
Nonconsumption is rampant at the bottom of the population pyramid, where 
consumers are very happy with very little. Galanz uses the strategy of targeting the 
bottom of the middle. Galanz was a textile and garment manufacturer seeking a new 
growth engine in 1992. Microwaves hardly seemed to be a logical choice because the 
market was mature and shrinking. Most potential consumers in developed countries 
already had microwaves. 
In 1993, only 2 percent of all Chinese households owned a microwave oven. Most 
families in China did not have kitchens large enough to accommodate western style ones, 
so Galanz developed a simple, small and thus cheap model, and trumped noncomsuption 
in the domestic markets. Then Galanz created a business model that could be profitable at 
low price points一first for higher-end Chinese customers and then for established 
customers in developed countries. After that, it moved steadily up-market to build larger 
microwaves with more features, beginning to disrupt microwave oven markets in 
developed countries (Christensen, 2005). 
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Focus Strategy 
Business groups (qiye jituan) have emerged rapidly since 1980s with the 
encouragement and assistances from the state. Rather than focusing on a core business or 
dominating a few markets, most Chinese prefer diversification, quit those markets where 
competition is rising, or enter new markets whenever profitable opportunities beckon 
(Economist, March 2004). Galanz, however, resisted the temptation of diversifying into 
various industries and focused on a single product, microwave oven, for around 8 years 
between 1993 and 2000. By focusing on one industry, Galanz became the largest 
microwave oven producer in the world, making one in three microwave ovens sold the 
world over. 
Related Diversification 
Even in 2000 when Galanz entered into air conditioning industry, it copied its 
"Galanz Model" from microwave oven industry, which is highly related to air 
conditioning industry. By 2003, Galanz has already become one of the top four air-
conditioner exporters in China, standing neck to neck with Haier, Gree and Midea. 
Order of Market Entry 
The exact market entry pattern of Galanz is not as clear as the route Haier took. 
Galanz employs the way of OEM when it enters the developed countries in Europe and 
the U.S., and makes equipment for about 250 companies from around the world, 
including companies such as GE. 
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Performance 
Due to the difficulty of obtaining data from unlisted companies, most of Galanz's 
financial figures were not available. Business and economic sources such as The Business 
Review and IBM report suggest that Galanz sells its products in 200 countries and regions. 
Its annual revenue in 2005 reached $1,325 million, and it has built 40 percent of the 
world's microwave ovens and dominates its home market in China. It also boasts itself as 
the world's biggest maker of microwave ovens. 
Summary 
Starting from domestic market, Galanz has been using a new-market disruptive 
strategy, exploring new demands from customers who were overshot or ignored. It 
continues the same positioning strategy when it entered the global market, focusing on 
the niche market. By capturing the market its mainstream competitors ignore, Galanz 
increased its sales significantly by exploiting shrinking microwave oven markets. Unlike 
the original globalization approach taken by Haier, Galanz depends on the OEM 
approach, realizing sales by making equipment for well-established companies around 
the world. The company also employs a highly-related diversification strategy, making 
only microwave ovens and air-conditioners. The overall international performance of this 
company in both product lines is exceptional. The strategies made Galanz the world's 
largest microwave oven maker. 
5.2.3 Geely 
Previously a motorcycle and real estate conglomerate, Geely started to make cars 
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in 1998. It is one of a few independent Chinese car manufactures focusing exclusively on 
building its own brand for the Chinese mass market. Now as China's largest private car 
maker, Geely Automobile makes 180,000 cars a year, with models including sedans and a 
sports car (Wall Street Journal, 2006d). Founded nine years ago, Geely has grabbed a 10 
percent domestic market share with vehicles priced much cheaper than its foreign rivals. 
After establishing itself in the mainland's burgeoning market for economy cars, 
Geely is shifting its focus and raising its ambition. It sells cars not only within China, but 
also in Latin America, the Middle East and Russia. It even signed a joint-venture deal 
recently to build London's iconic black taxicabs for sale in England. Geely's chairman, 
Mr. Li Shufu wants to be China's Henry Ford, making affordable autos for the Chinese 
masses and exporting them around the world. Specifically, Geely aims to cell more than 
60 percent of its annual output to oversea countries and regions in ten years. 
Geely's ambition is to aim to increase sales from a paltry 140,000 in 2005 to 2 
million by 2015 (Financial Times, 2006a), with two thirds of them being exported. With 
demand for affordable cars growing in China's less-affluent cities, Geely will soon open 
plants in the western city of Lanzhou and in central Hunan province. The Lanzhou factory, 
which will make one of the company's best-selling sedans, the Free Cruiser, will also 
export to Russia. Geely has been actively expanding its market network in the Middle 
East, North Africa and South America. Already, Geely has exported more than 20,000 
cars to 42 countries, mostly in the developing world such as the Middle East, Africa and 
Central America. But according to Geely's international operation head, it is only its first 
step. The company plans to start selling in richer Asian countries and Eastern Europe. In 
the last step, with its competitor, state-owned Chery Automobile, Geely is vying to 
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become the first Chinese carmakers to export vehicles to Western European countries and 
the US. Geely brought 12 cars to the US for testing in 2005，and put one on display 
during 2006，s Detroit auto show. According to Mr. John Harmer, chief operating officer 
of Geely's US unit, the first Geely model on sale in the US would be a very basic 
automobile, with the price at about $7,500, which is roughly two-thirds the price of the 
cheapest cars available in the US. The model, however, would still be equipped with 
power windows, air-conditioning and a CD player (Financial Times, 2006b). 
Geely's operating-profit margin increased to 8.8% in 2006, compared with 6.5% 
in 2005, as the company "steered its product mix towards high-end models" (Wall Street 
Journal, 2007). 
Still, Geely has plenty of obstacles to overcome to become a true global player. 
Even in the developing markets, it has not been all smooth sailing; Geely's plan for auto 
assembly plants in Malaysia was rebuffed in 2006. The brand still falls short of the 
quality and reliability standards expected in Western markets and failed key quality tests 
in Germany recently. People believe that Chinese car companies do not yet have the skill 
and experience needed to run a global business that can distribute and repair the vehicles 
in countries around the world. 
Strategies 
The scenario rated by experts suggested that by going abroad, Geely sells a 
narrow range of products, targets special geographic markets, and emphasizes on niche 
markets and smaller and specialty distributions. Policy capturing survey also showed very 
low ratings for both the position and market range (2.30 out of 7 for position score and 
85 
2.63 out of 7 for target score). The following paragraphs are talking about the positioning 
and market range in details. 
Positioning Strategy 
Even Geely boasts itself as a global car maker rather than a small domestic low-
end supplier. As a Hong Kong-listed car maker, Geely has mainly produced low-end cars 
of prices set to RMB 30,000 per unit. The competitiveness of the company is still based 
on price, which is normally 20-30 percent lower than its counterparts. Geely's current 
strategy is to solidify its foothold in the second-tier market places. In a nutshell, the 
company currently positions at low-end in the market. 
Still, Geely plans to evolve into a medium-to-high-end car supplier, just as its 
Executive Director Lawrence Ang puts it "what we want is to move up and up." More 
high-end vehicles are in the works, including the iconic London black taxi and sedans 
with larger engines that Geely will roll these out from its Shanghai-based joint venture 
with Manganese Bronze Holdings, which will be both for domestic sale and export. 
When the expansion ground is mature, Geely aims to the top-tier markets in the US and 
Europe, which the Geely management does not expect to happen in the coming five years. 
In an effort to break into these more profitable markets, Geely recently hired a former 
DaimlerChrysler engineering executive to spearhead its efforts to build cars aimed at 
those markets. 
Focus Strategy 
Geely was previously a motorcycle and real estate conglomerate, but it focused on 
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marking cars starting inl998. As suggested by the expert rating scenario, Geely aims at 
specified markets, making only economy cars which are affordable by the Chinese 
masses and the whole world. 
Market Entry Order 
According to Geely's official statement, its first step is to globally export to the 
developing countries. After that, the company aims at richer Asian and Eastern Europe 
countries. The last step is to export to the more developed markets such as the US and 
Western European countries. So far, Geely has only reached the first step, exporting its 
good enough cars with unbeatable prices to developing countries in the Middle East, 
North Africa, and South America. The plan to enter U.S. and Europe has been delayed 
since it is announced in 2005. 
Performance 
Geely makes 180,000 cars a year, with models including sedans and a sports car. 
It has exported more than 20,000 cars to 42 countries, most of them to developing 
economies. The annual revenue in 2005 is only $624 million, making Geely at bottom of 
the top 60 list. But the total assets increase significantly every year (Figure 5), with a 
steadily growing ROA. 
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Figure 5. Geely's Assets from 2002 to 2006 
Summary 
Geely sells affordable cars in developing countries, also using a new-market 
disruptive strategy, serving customers who were overshot or previously ignored by higher 
end competitors. The company plans to upgrade the quality and technology of its product 
and aim at sophisticated customers in developed markets in Western Europe and North 
America. Not ready for this stage in terms of technology, management and market skills, 
Geely has delayed its penetration into these developed countries again and again. So far 
the international business is increasingly profitable, but Geely has a long way to go to 
make its brand on the world stage. 
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5.2.4 Huawei 
Shenzhen based Huawei Technologies sells the most DLCs in the world. Huawei 
does not have the most technologically advanced DLCs on the market, but it sells low-
cost, no-frills DLCs to the world's fastest growing markets: the industrializing countries 
of Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Although 90 percent of Huawei's DLC sales 
are in domestic market, the company is using that solid position in its booming home 
market to go on the attack around the world. It's also the world leader in CDMA450一a 
low-cost cellular network requiring far fewer base station than other networks~which 
has been deployed in the markets from Tibet to Russia to Portugal. 
In the developing world, where Huawei has enjoyed the bulk of its success 
outside of China, the company won business with prices 25 percent or more below those 
of Western bidders. But in mature and developed markets like Europe and the U.S. where 
vendors and clients have longstanding ties, leading-edge technology is important. 
In contrast with its recent progress encountered outside China from the Middle 
East to Latin America and even Europe, Huawei encountered a setback in the U.S. In 
2004 Huawei landed its first contract with a U.S. wireless carrier. The Wall Street Journal 
believed that Huawei had a mission of using the company's cut-rate prices to take 
customers from the likes of Cisco Systems Inc. and Lucent Technologies Inc. As China's 
largest telecom equipment maker, however, Huawei has yet to land any deals with big 
U.S. phone companies, such as SBC Communications Inc., winning only a few contracts 
with smaller firms (Wall Street Journal, 2005). In actuality, Huawei’s real strategy in the 
U.S. is to grow by lining up its own new customers rather than trying to buy its way into 
the American market. 
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Strategy 
The scenario rated by experts suggested that going abroad, Huawei sells a not-so-
broad range of products (average), targets broader customers in different geographic 
markets, and emphasizes on R&D for new products. Policy capturing survey showed 
relatively high ratings for both the position and market range (4.80 out of 7 for position 
score and 4.73 out of 7 for target score). The following paragraphs are talking about the 
positioning and market range in details. 
Positioning Strategy 
Huawei was well positioned to play the low-cost role. Huawei has been using low 
prices to win business in emerging markets, including China, to gain market share at the 
expense of foreign giants such as Ericsson and Motorola. Huawei's expansion outside 
China was sparked by winning the first overseas contract from Hong Kong's Hutchison-
Whampoa to provide fixed-line network products. It is now emerging as a leading player 
in third-generation (3G) mobile phone equipment, which brings board-band Internet 
access and videoconferencing to mobile phone handsets (Electronic Business, 2005). 
Now the company is supplying 3G systems to carriers in Europe, Africa and the Middle 
East, even before China settles on a 3G standard. Of the 19 licenses issued around the 
world in 2004 for high-end wireless networks 3G, Huawei was involved in building 14 of 
them. The company boasts itself as the No. 1 in global market for the shipment quantity 
of switches, for the number of intelligent network subscribers, No. 3 in the world market 
for the optical network and No. 2 in global market for the broadband products. As its own 
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strategy statement put it: "We decided to develop globally.. .We are building Huawei into 
a world-class company in every aspect." 
Established it major sales bases in developing countries, the company also has 
penetrated the markets in 14 developed nations in Europe and North America in addition 
to market expansion in developing countries. 
Diversifying Strategy 
Huawei，s products range from fixed- and mobile-network. It is the broadest 
Chinese player in the market. Besides, the market Huawei targets also include developing 
countries where customers expect low-priced and acceptable-quality products and 
developed countries where competitors are high-end brand name such as Ericsson and 
Siemens and customers expect high-end products such as networks on a 3G standard. 
Market Entry Order 
After working in Russia in 1996，and establishing a representative office in 
Moscow and a joint venture BETO-Huawei in UFA, Huawei made its first significant 
international sale to a Russian telecom carrier in 2000, followed by sales to Thailand's 
largest mobile phone carrier, Advanced Info Service, and Brazil's fixed-line carrier Tele 
Norte Leste Participacoes. In 2005, Huawei won deals with a Dutch mobile operator, 
Tel fort, and France's second largest Internet service provider, Free. 
But Huawei’s target markets are still developing countries such as Russia, 
Thailand, Singapore, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 




Huawei doubled its international sales in each of five consecutive years from 
2001 to 2005 (Figure 6). Currently, the products and solutions have been deployed by 
over 300 operators in over 90 countries and regions. 22 of the world's top 50 telecom 
operators have selected Huawei's products. Overseas contract sales for this unlisted 
company by revenue are forecast to rise 30% to 40% next year, driven mainly by sales in 
Europe. In addition, the company has already stuck several partnerships with overseas 
players, including big Spanish-based telecoms carrier Telefonica, US router networking 
gear maker 3Com Corp, German giant Siemens (Wall Street Journal, 2005). 
Figure 6. Huawei's Financial Performance from 2001 to 2005 
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Summary 
Huawei gained huge profits from its international business first by positioning at 
lower end, selling low-priced products to emerging markets including the domestic 
market. It focused on developing countries in favor of China's political relations and the 
low price its product charged, to avoid the obstacles in developed markets where vendors 
and clients have longstanding ties and main competitors have leading-edge technology. 
But since it has enjoyed the bulk of success from developing countries, the company 
positions itself as higher end more-sophisticated network producer. Not only has Huawei 
moved into developed markets but it has also expanded its product lines. While still 
mostly counting on sales from developing countries, Huawei has entered markets in 
Europe and North America despite stiff incumbent competition. The financial data 
indicates a steady growth of this company, and Huawei expects its strong growth in 
overseas contracts in the future.. 
5.2.4 Case Summary 
The four companies in the case analysis belong to four different industries, and 
they use different strategies respectively when they go abroad. The commonplace is they 
have all achieved impressive success internationally. Unsurprisingly, Galanz earned both 
profits and brand name by positioning itself at lower-end, creating new market thus new 
demand, and focusing on highly related products. Galanz has penetrated the markets in 
many countries and acquired large size of market share for microwave ovens. Haier also 
relied on related products in markets overseas, even when it positioned at higher-end. For 
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market entry order, Haier firstly entered developed thus sophisticated and difficult 
markets, and later developing and less demanding markets, the opposite order as most 
Chinese companies follow and this thesis proposed. Yet, Haier is one of the most well-
known brands from China, and this company gained large market share. The automaker 
Geely is a relatively new face on the world's stage. Even though it plans to upgrade itself 
as high-end carmaker, the schedule has been postponed again and again. So far Geely has 
made some success in penetrating developing countries selling modest model with low 
price. Last but not least, is the case of telecom equipment maker Huawei. Huawei has 
already become rivals to some high-end players such as Cisco and Ericsson, starting by 
new market disruption—Huawei managed to capture the markets in developing countries 
in Africa and Middle East. Now Huawei has the broadest product lines in the market, and 
it aims at developed markets in Europe and North America. The financial indicator shows 
this company's performance is still good. And Huawei did establish its brand in many 
markets.However, evidence shows it runs into some difficulties in penetrating developed 
markets to date. 
In a nutshell, the case analysis indicates that for Chinese companies going global, 
they earn market share firstly by disrupting from lower-end and creating new demand 
from customers in developing countries who are ignored by mainstream competitors. 
These China firms target niche market with single product or highly related products, 
rather than employing diversifying strategies as most domestic firms do at home. 
Although some of the most well known and successful firms are considering shifting 
toward higher-end and competition in developed countries, for most companies, this 
strategy is still in the phase of planning. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Discussion 
The findings of this study showed that even the relatively few companies which 
have globalization potential are greatly different in terms of their strategies. In market 
entry order decisions, most Chinese companies have started with neighboring countries in 
Southeast Asia and other developing countries. These markets are relatively easy due to 
the tremendous demand from the bottom. A few others, like Haier, took the opposite 
approach of tackling a more difficult market first (the USA and Europe), but these firms 
have still made good progress so far. 
In market positioning, most exporters choose to concentrate on lower end of the 
market, providing affordable products with acceptable quality. This strategy has worked 
well especially in developing markets, e.g., Geely, Galanz, Konka, etc. But some players, 
such as SVA, one main rival to Sichuan Changhong and TCL, focused on high-end 
products with a medium pricing strategy, by passing direct competition from both brand 
competition at the top end and price competition at the lower end. And Huawei, the 
telecom equipment maker, once benefited from low-end disruption strategy, is climbing 
up the ladder and aiming high end market to become a "world-class company in every 
aspect". The financial performances of both companies indicate they are making profits 
so far, but Huawei has already stuck in some of its expansion in developed countries. 
In regard to market range, theoretically, this thesis hypothesized that narrower 
target related to better company performance. However, quantitative results showed a 
positive relation between broad market range and performance. Further case studies 
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suggested some companies, such as Haier, when they reach foreign markets they must 
use a relate-diversification strategy instead of targeting different markets and selling 
unrelated products, as they did in home market. The reason that quantitative data failed to 
support the hypotheses might be partly explained by the unclear financial indicators, 
especially without the separation of domestic and international performance. As indicated 
in the case analysis, companies such as Haier and Huawei pursued very different 
strategies in and out of home market. This also explains the difference in their 
performance. Also, broader market range means to aim at more customers. The bottom of 
pyramid theory argues that a lower positioning strategy gains profits through a large 
amount of sales, which is reflected by a wider market range. 
Both quantitative and qualitative results did largely support the hypotheses stating 
that companies positioning at lower end and target wider market range when they enter 
foreign market tend to have better performance (general performance, and financial 
performance in terms of ROE and ROA). For all the 20 companies studied in this thesis, 
some successful ones (as defined by the financial indicators in Chapter 4 and 5) strictly 
follow the low-end disruption strategy and aim at wider market range or use related 
diversifying strategies. Companies like Geely, Galanz, and Wanxiang are examples of 
such successful companies. 
There are also other companies that either position themselves at higher end or 
pursue over-diversification strategy but they still gain good profits and build their brands 
in the foreign markets. Or companies even follow the lower-end wider market rande 
approach but fail. These are anomalies in this study. As indicated by Carlie and 
Christensen (2005), the key to discovering problems in definition and measurement is to 
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understand the anomalies or outliers. Anomalies often occur in the process of theory 
building with statements of association or causality to predict the observations. These 
anomalies are something the theory could not explain, but they are useful and valuable 
since the discovery of an anomaly is the enabling step to less ambiguous description and 
measurement, identifying and improving the categorization scheme in a body of theory. 
Haier, CITIC, and China WorldBest Group (CWGC) are the few Chinese 
companies growing using diversified business groupings. Once their growth has reached 
a high level, these companies adopt this strategy. For example, CWGC is the largest 
textile group and also the largest pharmaceutical group in China. Its life science business 
covers the biological, pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors. The textile business 
comprises an integrated R&D，production and marketing system. The group has 
established many overseas subsidiaries and branches in North America, Europe, West 
Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. 
Haier started making refrigerators and later expanded into washing machines and 
other household appliances. It is now manufacturing more than 15,000 product items in 
96 categories, ranging from white and brown goods, consumer electronics, to totally 
unrelated businesses such as pharmaceuticals, logistics, catering and financial services. 
Haier even declared that diversification is one of its main elements of its long-term 
growth strategy. Unsurprisingly, most of the unrelated diversification ventures ended in 
failure after modest initial success in the home market. But internationally, Haier does not 
diversify as it does domestically. It focused on niche market of wine coolers and small 
refrigerators fitted for students' dorms, and the highly related diversification strategy has 
won it both fat profits and brands recognition. 
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And Haier, in some respects is an unusual case among Chinese MNCs. Although 
it targeted some nearby developing country markets in southeast Asia, its main 
internationalization thrust has been directed at highly developed regions such as the US, 
Japan and Europe. Its philosophy is simply "enter a difficult advanced market first, and 
then go to easy, underdeveloped markets "(Kiran, 2004). Early in 1990s, Haier started to 
export to these developed countries. For the international business, its strategy could be 
said to be successful so far, however, it is still believed that Haier is pursuing a high-risk 
policy, and there are doubts on low long this policy could be maintained in view of the 
mounting pressures it is facing on margins at home market (Business Week, 2004). 
Perhaps the idea behind the strategy could at least partially explain its success一Haier is 
to build an international brand name by competing in the markets which are the most 
difficult to enter, which motives the company to achieve high quality, innovation and 
customer service. Intending to enter the regular white-goods market in the US, Haier 
initially aimed at niche segments in the household appliances market with innovative 
products to differentiate itself. The small refrigerators and wine coolers gained costumer 
loyalty because few US manufactures produce these. After that, Haier started to sell in 
large chain stores such as Wal-Mart and Sears, and gained 50 percent of the compact 
refrigerator market and 70 percent for wine coolers by 2003 (Kiran, 2004). 
SVA, the TV maker which has production and sales presence in nine countries, 
has successfully transformed itself into a leading electronics company. It mainly targeted 
at higher-end customers in developed countries such as the US. Its strategy was to focus 
on upmarket products such as plasma TVs, to avoid the low-end color TV market in 
which the competition is intense from other Chinese companies selling on an OEM basis. 
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The reason is this company produces products at low cost and high quality. It firstly 
worked with distributors to leam more about the local market in US and sold through 
websites such as Amazon. Rather than investing into brand awareness, it used trade-level 
promotional activities. The prices were also set below the levels of its Japanese and South 
Korean competitors, but above those of low price companies. Quality drove up sales and 
beat competition. 
On the other hand, results also suggested that some companies, even applying 
low-end disruptive and focus strategies, are so far not performing well. Companies such 
as Ningbo Bird, Hisense, Konka, Sichuan Changhong, and Skyworth, most of them in 
household appliance manufacturing industry, reported very small or even negative ROA 
and ROE. All these companies neither position their product at high-end in developing or 
developed markets, nor diversify their product ranges targeting at more than one market. 
Sichuan Changhong reported losses of $441 million merely in the year 2004, largely due 
to its failed business dealings with its US distributor. The dealing with Apex Digital, the 
US-based distributor began in 2002, which sold its TVs to low-cost retailers around the 
country. Hisense has had only limited success exporting faced with growing competition 
at home such as domestic firms like Haier and international giants like Siemens and LG. 
Only about 40 percent of Hisense products shipped abroad carried its own bran d name, 
while the rest carried names of other companies that Hisense manufactures for, such as 
Hewlett-Packard, and NEC. For Skyworth, the overseas operation was poor, too, as gross 
profit margins fell to minus 0.2 percent from 7.2 percent previously. Rather than 
competing with bigger rivals by focusing on higher-end televisions, Hisense focused on 
Asian markets including Malaysia and Singapore, to circumvent the restrictions in 
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developed markets. 
The problem might be due to the lack of brand awareness. Many of China's 
manufacturing powerhouses are pushing to boost exports of their own-brand sales over 
products bearing other companies' names. Own-brand sales typically carry bigger profit 
margins even though they require more marketing expense and experiences. Skyworth, 
Hisense, Sichuan Changhong and even more successful TV maker TCL all intend to stick 
to original equipment manufacturing (OEM) for global brands. For Example, Skyworth's 
branded products currently only account for 10 percent of the company's exports. Ningbo 
Bird, the mobile phone maker, sells its products at the lowest prices and aims at lower-
end but the fastest growing markets in India, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Russia. 
Except for TCL, which will be able to draw on Thomson's distribution channels 
and its power as the world's largest TV maker, overseas markets are not so profitable for 
the Chinese companies initially. Gross margins on Chinese TV makers' OEM exports for 
foreign customers are even lower than those they earn at home (Financial Times, 2004). 
The bargaining power remain depends on technology and branding, while these 
companies are just starting to overcome the mainland's reputation for shoddy goods and 
build an international brand. 
Trends and Challenges 
Chinese companies will undoubtedly accelerate their global activities in line with 
China's ascent as a major economic power. Studies (Luostarinen, 1979; Cavusgil & 
Godiwalla, 1982; Kim & Kwang，1992; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Du, Kang & Ke，2006; 
Fan, 2005; 2006) suggest that there are different routes being taken by Chinese firms 
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towards globalization. While some Chinese companies will globalize organically, many 
others will pursue joint ventures, strategic partnerships, or mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) to accelerate their global presence. 
OEM combines the cost advantage of a Chinese enterprise with the brand 
advantage of a foreign firm. Galanz took this route and has grown into a dominant 
manufacturer of the microwave oven. International joint ventures, on the other hand, have 
been consistently given incentives by the Chinese government as a means to transfer 
technology and expertise to Chinese firms. The Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation (SAIC) is the case in point. But joint ventures may not be effective for 
Chinese firms to build up their own international reputation since the joint venture is 
often associated with the foreign partner's name and reputation rather than the Chinese 
partner's identity (Inkpen, 1995; Simonin, 2004; Child & Rodrigues，2005). 
In recent years, TCL has been one of China's biggest movers, with key 
acquisitions including Alcatel's mobile handset business, and television-maker Thomson 
in France, even though the Thomson purchase gave it a loss-making business with a 
severely faded TV brand, RCA. In May 2005, Lenovo's completed its $1.75 billion take 
over of IBM's PC business, making it the world's third largest PC vendor after Dell and 
Hewlett-Packard with 8% of the world market. What worth notice is that both companies 
not only acquire the high-tech to facilitate production lines but also the brand names and 
distribution channels. Other M&A deals are SAIC's 50.6 percent acquisition of Korea's 
Sangyong, China National Petroleum Corporation's (CNPC) US$4.2 billion acquisition 
of Petro Kazakhstan and Haier's unsuccessful bid for Maytag in 2005, all highlighting 
Chinese companies' ambitions to expand globally by securing assets and capabilities. 
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Also, there is a significant trend for China's natural resource companies to make 
natural resource-focused investment to produce oil and gas, refined oil products and 
petrochemicals, or iron and steels and to exploit nonferrous metals. Examples are China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), Shouguang, Baosteel, etc. 
Although China has the world's fastest growing economy and is a major exporter, 
the major indigenous sectors of China's economy - the state and private sectors, however, 
have little global footprint and are generally not competitive against locally domiciled 
FIEs (Gilboy, 2004; Restall, 2006). Even China has created some quite large companies 
over the past decade, with more than a dozen in the Fortune 500 list. Almost all of those 
are domestic monopolies or near monopolies, such as telecom operators or big 
commodity producers. There are a handful of others that are starting to compete 
internationally, but most of them are in niche markets and on price rather than with 
technology or brands. 
Brands represent features and value. Most consumers in most developed 
economies prefer those brands they know (Douglas & Nijssen, 2004; Granzin & Olsen, 
1998; Heslop & Beracs, 1990). Since branded producers can charge higher prices partly 
because the promised higher quality, Chinese companies are challenged in developed 
markets in this issue (Gao，Woetzel & Wu, 2003). This promises to change in the future 
as the developed world recognizes Chinese products. 
The development of technological capabilities is not placed high on the scale of 
importance in China. To respond regulatory inconsistency and opacity under China's 
unreformed political system, managers prefer to pursue short-term returns rather than 
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investing in long-term technological development. Even during the 1990s, Chinese firms 
did not invest heavily in developing new technology, and R&D expenditure remained low, 
and well below the average for OECD countries and "peer" developing countries such as 
Russia and India. Besides, the spending on indigenizing is also far below comparable 
ratios worldwide. Chinese firms have a "disregard for learning" and prefer to import 
technology embodied in machinery. Through that machinery they generate production as 
quickly as possible (Gilboy, 2003). Even the most dynamic and ambitious companies 
such as Huawei and Haier, only focus on capacity building rather than technological 
innovation. TCL, the most distinguished company in the television industry, boasts of a 
Chinese Sony or Samsung. It bought the TV business of France's Thomson in early 2004 
and is spending on Thomson's rear-projection technology to make thinner sets to defend 
itself against Samsung. In general, the total spending on R&D by the top 100 enterprises 
in 2005 registered at CNY 35.63 billion (about 4.5 billion USD), accounting for only 
3.72% of their total operating revenues. That might explain why these firms are more 
likely to be component manufacturers or processors of intermediate goods than global 
consumer brands. Also, Chinese companies need overseas distribution channels and 
service networks, stronger promotional or advertising savvy and pricing skills to develop 
preferences of Western customers. 
6.2 Implications 
6.2.1 Implication for Theory 
From the theoretical perspective, this research largely supports the disruption 
strategy stream with China's empirical data in regard to companies from the emerging 
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economy going global. This stream of work (Christensen, 1997; 2000; Druehl & Schmidt, 
2005; Khanna & Palepu, 2006; Kim & Mauborgne, 1999; 2005; Schmidt & Porteus，2000; 
Sood & Tellis, 2005) suggests that developing country companies should seek and gain 
new market demand from low-end disruption, by avoiding direct competition with 
mainstream players. They should target once ignored or overshot customers with cheaper 
product with good-enough-quality. The reasons are these companies still lack the 
experience, skill and technology to compete with high-end counterparts head-to-head, 
since these high-end companies are having trouble in the mainstream markets themselves. 
While there are a huge unexplored markets at the bottom part of population pyramid, the 
demand from customers with lower income who are satisfied with cheap enough and 
acceptable quality products is potential profits. Quantitative and qualitative results of this 
study testify this theory on the Chinese companies which active globally. 
Besides, results of this study also support the bottom of population pyramid 
argument, which suggests a wide range of market at the bottom tier will bring huge 
profits through large volume of unit sales. For the diversifying strategy theory, 
historically, companies with high level of diversification are believed to be less profitable 
as research in the West has shown. However, the proposition that the diversified 
conglomerates in Asian countries destroy value and therefore should be dismantled is met 
with very little rigorous evidence in Asian countries (Granovetter, 1997; Keister, 2000; 
Peng, 1997; Khanna & Palepu，2000). Researchers have argued that without a credible 
legal framework, and stable political structure, firms tend to form conglomerates with 
high level of diversification to lower the business risks (Khanna & Palepu，1997; Peng & 
Health 1996; Peng, 2002). Data from this thesis is not able to clarify whether Chinese 
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companies perform better by using focus or diversification strategy. As a result, for 
further study, definitions on diversification also need to be further clarified, since 
diversification both refers to product lines and market scopes. 
In explaining international strategies and market entry of Chinese companies, 
researchers need to pay attention to institutions as well. China is a large developing 
country where government involvement has been particularly significant (Dunning & 
Narula, 1996). Both the central and local government is by all means encouraging and 
directing exports and overseas investment. Moreover, policy makers are increasing 
spending on R&D to shift Chinese companies toward higher-end players on the world 
stage. On the other hand, the significant cost advantage once enjoyed by Chinese firms is 
moving to other Asian countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Meanwhile, 
Chinese companies are still not well equipped to compete with high-end players in the 
developed markets in terms of brands building, marketing, distributor relations, etc. Other 
than that, researches need also take the developing market conditions into account. The 
huge potential market demands ignored by mainstream competitors could be an ideal 
profit source for developing country companies, and empirical data from this study does 
provide evidence that companies gain success by focusing on once forgotten markets. 
6.2.2 Implication for Research 
Methodologically, the two-phase design used in this study represents an improved 
research design over the adoption of either a large sample empirical study or an in-depth 
case study. A literally large sample is almost impossible for this study since the Chinese 
companies going global is still a very recent phenomenon and the number of such 
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companies is small. According to the criteria stated in Chapter 4, there are only 60 
Chinese companies with global potential. And many of them are expanding overseas 
either through the way of merger or acquisition with the purpose of securing raw material 
suppliers to power the country's rapid economic growth. The number of companies fall in 
this study's research scope, therefore, is only 36. The sample size of 20 is relatively a 
large sample size to this extent. 
Also, due to the difficulty of obtaining PIMS type of data for Chinese companies 
unlisted or listed on Shanghai or Shenzhen stock markets, the approaches of expert rating 
and policy capturing were employed to compensate the problem. The combination of 
these two methods promised the validity and reliability of data collecting since expert 
judges ruled out biases such as leniency and halo, while policy capturing secured the 
consistency of ratings. 
The case studies as the qualitative methods provided more insights which 
quantitative data could not. The comparison of selected cases gave possible explanations 
to paradoxical results shown by the quantitative study. 
6.2.3 Implication for Practice 
Firms that have emerged as important national and global players have tried to 
develop powerful and clearly identifiable brands, operate beyond local and regional 
boundaries, and achieve significant market share in their respective product areas. Some 
of these firms have gone a step farther by reaching out into major global markets, 
whether through the export of branded products, the establishment of overseas R&D and 
representative offices, the acquisition of overseas subsidiaries, or even the opening of 
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overseas manufacturing facilities. 
In the telecommunications equipment sector (switches and routers), at least two 
Chinese firms—Huawei and ZTE~have emerged as plausible competitors to global 
leaders like Cisco, Nortel, and Alcatel (Einhom et al. 2002). Both Huawei and ZTE have 
achieved significant share in the home market. Until just a few years ago, this market was 
completely dominated by foreign producers and it happens to be the second largest 
globally in telecom fixed equipment. Huawei produces low-cost, reasonably high-quality 
versions of devices sold by industry leaders like Cisco. While Huawei products lag 
somewhat behind those of industry leaders technologically, they sell for as little as 60 
percent of the cost of state-of-the-art devices (Einhom et al. 2002). Huawei has begun 
making inroads into foreign markets, achieving in 2001 a 156 percent increase in 
international sales. The Shenzhen-based firm has branch offices in thirty-two nations and 
research institutes in the United States, India, Sweden, and Russia. Overseas sales still 
represent only 10 percent of the firm's business, but the company aims to expand that 
figure (Einhom et al. 2002). Huawei has recently won equipment contracts in Brazil, 
Kenya, Ecuador, Russia, Egypt, and Germany. The company has also opened sales offices 
in San Jose, Northern Virginia. In terms of international research collaborations, Huawei 
in 2002 agreed with Microsoft to set up a joint lab in Shenzhen, and with NEC to set up a 
lab in Shanghai. 
Lenovo, the leading IT company in China, has developed a powerful domestic 
brand and has matched that brand with significant market share. For personal computers, 
Lenovo, through the middle of 2002, accounted for 27.7 percent of the Chinese market 
and 12.2 percent of the Asia-Pacific (excluding Japan) market. By the mid-1990s, Lenovo 
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also became one of the world's top five suppliers of computer motherboards and add-on 
cards. Interestingly, the company's initial growth was fueled by innovation in Chinese 
word-processing technology, namely the development and commercialization of a word-
processing add-on card for IBM-compatible PCs (for an extensive description, see Lu 
2000).The firm, in effect, offered an innovative and much-needed method for localizing 
PCs for the Chinese market. Lenovo in the late 1980s elected to tailor its add-on card to 
the AST PC, and became the sole distributor of AST machines in China (Lu 2000, 74). As 
AST became the leading brand in China and Lenovo's revenues soared, the Chinese 
company's expansion-not to mention rapid climb up the manufacturing learning curve-
began in earnest. Through a series of Hong Kong acquisitions, Lenovo quickly moved 
into the design and manufacturing of PC motherboards, shipping a steady volume of 
3,500 units per month by the fall of 1989 (Lu 2000,74). 
The next step involved combining the firm's Hong Kong-based manufacturing 
capabilities for motherboards with its PC distribution network in Mainland China 
(developed for AST) to introduce Lenovo-branded PCs into the home market. This 
occurred precisely when the market for PCs in China began to boom. By the end of the 
1990s, Lenovo PCs were the top brand in China, and the firm was publicly listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The firm also was pursuing a strategy of vertical integration, 
both backward (from motherboard and add-on card to printed circuit board 
manufacturing) and forward into system integration services and software. Today, 
Lenovo is still primarily a manufacturing company, with products ranging from PCs, 
palmtop computers, laptops, and cell phones, all the way to basic hardware components. 
By its own account, the firm aims to extend its reach into high-margin IT services and 
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applications. 
The rapid growth and transformation of the Chinese automotive sector is one of 
the most significant recent developments in the global auto industry. Sizable exports of 
fully assembled cars by Chinese indigenous automakers such as Geely, Chery, Changan 
Auto and Great Wall Motor have already begun to tap emerging markets in South East 
Asia, Africa, the Middle East and South America. Domestic manufactures like Geely, 
Chery, Changan and others are ramping up exports, especially to piece-conscious 
customers in the developing countries. A case in point, Chery has led the export push for 
passenger cars, selling 50,000 units overseas in 2006. The company assembles vehicles 
with local partners in Iran, Malaysia, Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and Egypt. But these 
automakers also keep an eye toward eventually breaking into bigger targets in developed 
markets. Rival Great Wall has already gained a quirky reputation for its Hover model 
after shipping 500 of the SUVs to Italy in 2006. Chery expects the alliance to eventually 
build compact cars for export to North America and Europe. SUV maker Hunan 
Changfeng Motors Co. hopes to begin exports to the US within two years. 
But in general, China's domestic automakers are still not ready to meet safety and 
environmental standards in the US and Europe, not to mention financing the service and 
sales networks they need to break into those already overcrowded markets. Moreover, 
they still lack the scale and efficiency needed to gain competitive edge. Another problem 
is even China's automakers are facing rising wages. This automatically makes exports 
more expensive abroad. Most of the Chinese automakers' plans for selling to Western 
markets have not materialized with the exception of Australia and Europe. Chery's earlier 
plans to sell vehicles in the US with American entrepreneur Malcolm Bricklin fell 
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through. Geely pushed back its target date for exports to the US to 2010. Other 
automakers are even more cautious: SAIC, FAW (First Auto Works), and Dongfeng 
Motor, have all taken go-slow approaches to exports, refusing to set targets for selling to 
advanced countries (New York Times, 2006). 
For household appliance makers, which are rooted in a large and open market 
where their products prove themselves daily against the world's best in features, quality 
and price, the products are less expensive because of China's low labor cost. Also, there 
is a large and growing pool of skilled engineers and the money to invest in new products. 
Some companies have already gained a foothold in the foreign markets, like TCL, SVT, 
etc. The focus on niche market where customers are keen about price but less demanding 
on high quality and fancy functions earned them huge sales. Other companies like Galanz 
and Haier, serve special markets which other competitors do not bother to enter, building 
their own brands while occupying the majority of that new market. 
Haier has a highly recognizable brand within China, and increasing brand 
recognition overseas as well. The company today commands half the U.S. niche market 
in compact refrigerators, and has also begun carving out a position in the production of 
electric wine cellars (Sprague 2002). While the U.S. market for standard home appliances 
is still dominated by global giants like Whirlpool, General Electric, and Maytag, Haier~ 
in a unique move for a Chinese firm—has recently attempted to gain ground by acquiring 
manufacturing facilities in South Carolina for full-sized refrigerators. In another high-
profile move, Haier America purchased the historic Landmark Building in downtown 
Manhattan as its new corporate headquarters. Haier products are today marketed under 
the company's own brand in twelve of Europe's top fifteen and eight of the United States' 
110 
M 
top ten chain store retailers." 
Also, there are companies represented by Hisense, Konka, Sichuan Changhong, 
etc. target lower-end market with low-priced but quality goods, but are nonetheless not as 
successful as their rivals such as Haier, TCL and Galanz. The theories of this study could 
not explain this phenomenon. The problem might due to the lack of brand awareness and 
too much dependence on the approach of OEM rather than original globalization. 
Several characteristics are common across these examples. First, the Mainland 
Chinese firms' success to date, at least in terms of market share, has for the most part 
been restricted to the Chinese home market. Even within that market, the emerging 
Chinese branded competitors still tend to occupy the lower-end segments. Their products 
compete mainly on the basis of low cost, and customers tend to view them as somewhat 
lower in quality, technological sophistication, and style than foreign alternatives. The 
same, of course, can be said for overseas markets, though Chinese branded firms have for 
the most part yet to achieve significant market share. The point is not that these firms 
necessarily produce shoddy products or even direct knockoffs: they have mastered 
extremely complex production processes and are producing goods that are in some sense 
viewed as substitutes for those of leading foreign firms. Rather, the point is that the 
Chinese are still at the stage in which their prime source of competitive advantage, even 
in their home market, is still low cost. 
Second, Chinese firms have shown little ability to engage in product innovation or 
overall product definition, areas that still appear the domain of leading foreign firms, 
whether globally or even within the Chinese market. For example, in China's mobile 
phone handset market, companies like Ericsson, Nokia, and Motorola still set the overall 
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design trends and occupy the high end of the market, while Chinese entrants like Bird 
follow in step with lower-cost alternatives. Even Lenovo, whose early successes came 
through innovative customization for the Chinese home market, today appears to have 
ceded higher-value product innovation activities to foreign partners, a pattern that will 
likely persist even after the acquisition of IBM's PC division. It has teamed with 
Microsoft to develop a tablet PC, incorporates IBM storage technology in its own storage 
products (while also producing on an OEM basis for IBM), employs IBM voice-
recognition software in its pocket computers, and, of course, like most PC manufacturers, 
uses Intel Pentium processors. Again, the point is not that Lenovo or companies like it are 
backward, but rather that they are primarily commodity manufacturing enterprises. The 
higher-value, proprietary aspects of their manufactured hardware are usually still 
controlled by foreign leading firms. Companies like Lenovo, in effect, are still in the 
position of being design takers rather than design makers. 
On the policy side, what makes Chinese industrial policy so difficult to 
comprehend is that for all its focus on market-based approaches and comparative 
advantage, it also has an entirely different side that embodies assumptions of heavily 
statist Japanese and South Korean models of the past. Policy makers in Beijing may be 
employing all the mechanisms associated with comparative advantage strategies, but the 
ultimate aim remains the creation of "national champion" firms in self-reliant, vertically 
integrated "pillar" industries (Nolan 2001, 16). This, after all, is what the "grasping the 
large" side of the zhua da fang xiao enterprise restructuring policy is all about. It is about 
creating exactly the type of organizations associated with the Japanese and Korean 
models of yore: large, vertically integrated business groups that encompass entire 
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industries from upstream to down, operate at the cutting edge of technology, and 
dominate global markets from their home base in China. Yet, this is a story that involves 
more than just new techniques for achieving old industrial ambitions. Rather, it is a story 
about a government claiming as its ultimate policy aim precisely the type of firms that its 
most high-profile restructuring (and trade) policies militate against. In essence, the 
government is seeking to create the very firms that comparative advantage, not to 
mention global technological change, select against. 
Of course, China's effort to build "national champion" conglomerates will likely 
differ from earlier Japanese and South Korean efforts in several respects. First, the 
Chinese economy today is much larger and more diversified than were the Japanese and 
South Korean systems at the height of their respective experiments with dirigisme 
industrial policy (Perkins 2001). China has an order of magnitude more industrial 
enterprises than either Japan or Korea did during their respective economic growth 
periods. The point is that simply to exert the same degree of control associated with the 
Korean model, Chinese policymakers would be dealing with an exponentially larger task 
and exponentially more complex information flows than anything experienced in the 
Korea of the 1970s. 
Japanese and South Korean developmental efforts were premised on the idea that, 
at least in their home markets, key industrial conglomerates would be granted sweeping 
protection. They would be held to international standards and encouraged to compete 
head to head with foreign firms in foreign markets, but, on the home front, they would be 
showered (selectively) with subsidies and sheltered from outside competition. As 
signified by the terms of China's WTO accession, though, the world today is not that of 
113 
the 1960s and 1970s.The world's wealthiest countries-though hardly paragons of free 
trade-simply do not tolerate the sorts of protectionism they once did with regard to Asian 
developers. Nor, somewhat ironically, are they inclined to tolerate the sorts of export 
flows previously generated by Asian "national" firms. "National champions' firms end up 
in reality as little more than local or regional players. At the same time, the focus on 
verticality encourages localities to think not in terms of cluster economies, innovative 
communities, or cross-cutting supply chains-the sorts of environments from which 
effective "comparative advantage" competitors are likely to emerge today-but instead in 
terms of self-contained industrial units, units that may coexist, but not interact. Firms end 
up with locally focused captive supply chains, a worst of all worlds situation even if one 
agrees with the goal of building integrated national conglomerates. To the extent the 
supply chain is held captive, it should at least be permitted to extend broadly in 
geographic terms (so as, hopefully, to incorporate "best-in-class" suppliers nationally). 
Keeping it local almost guarantees that the firm will fail to access the best suppliers, and 
hence will fail to produce world-class products. At the other extreme, to the extent one 
believes that firms should focus on modular activities and then link into upstream and 
downstream activities on a global basis (in line with the "comparative advantage" 
approach), administratively enforced captive supply chains should disappear altogether. 
The Issue of Catch-Up 
The preceding discussion still leaves open the question of catch-up the question of 
whether China's lead firms, for all their problems today, may just be in the first stages of 
catching and ultimately surpassing their foreign rivals. As firms like Haier or Huawei 
114 
enter North American and European markets, are we seeing a replay of the Japanese and 
South Korean story? Is it the same story of new competitors figuring out how to produce 
inexpensively, introducing products overseas first into lowest-end market segments, 
gradually building market share, and then finally down the road becoming dominant in 
high-value products? In answering these questions, it is worth considering the conditions 
under which Japanese and South Korean industrial firms rose decades ago. In that era, 
industries could still in a meaningful sense be understood as separate, self-contained 
entities, and often self-contained in national terms. We could refer to the U.S. steel or the 
French auto industry, and we could contemplate whether rising industrializers like Korea 
would develop strength in a particular industrial sector. Moreover, in these relatively 
autonomous industries, product innovation occurred in incremental terms, and 
manufacturing processes tended to be integral. 
The various steps in the process, while perhaps understood in broad terms in these 
stable industries, were uncodified (and given the state of IT at the time, probably 
uncodifiable). As such, they could not organizationally be pulled apart from one another, 
and they tended to be specific to each firm or each firm's captive supply chain. 
Challengers then, to the extent that they could amass the resources needed to enter these 
capital-intensive industries, could compete on the basis of process innovation, the ability 
to produce the same products as incumbents but at significantly lower cost (Amsden 
1989). Because manufacturing processes remained uncodified and integral within the 
firm, shop floor innovations were truly proprietary. They were, in effect, a form of art or 
craftsmanship that neither incumbents nor other entrants could easily copy. There was no 
open recipe to follow. 
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What that description suggests is that rising Chinese firms today are operating in a 
dramatically transformed era, one in which the methods of the past are not directly 
applicable. First, it is not whole industries that move today from developed to rising 
nations, but instead activities. As noted earlier, what has moved to China en masse, 
whether at the bequest of leading global companies or through pressures from Chinese 
firms themselves, are the manufacturing-intensive segments of particular value chains. 
More precisely, it is the codified, commodified, nonintegral manufacturing activities that 
move. Competing in these areas, while hardly trivial, often does involve mastering open 
processes rather than developing proprietary ones. 
It is for this reason in part that so many new entrants from China in manufacturing 
have appeared in contrast to the handful of firms that entered from Japan and South 
Korea in previous decades. Second, when Japanese and South Korean competitors 
emerged, they were rising up against relatively stable incumbents, incumbents whose 
focus was still on manufacturing. As such, the incumbents were essentially stationary 
targets whose products could be substituted with lower cost alternatives. Today, the 
situation is quite different. In large part because of modularization, the incumbents-global 
lead firms-are hardly stationary, and in many cases have completely transformed 
themselves. Firms like Lenovo, Haier, Huawei, and Bird may be rising on the basis of 
their low-cost manufacturing expertise. At the same time, most leading firms, e.g. IBM, 
Electrolux, Cisco, Motorola, Dell, are moving away from manufacturing entirely. Instead, 
they are increasingly focusing on what may be broadly termed the "service" side of 
production: overall product definition, design, marketing, and supply chain management. 
Lenovo may manufacture and sell PCs, but its nearest U.S. counterpart, Dell, the leading 
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U.S. PC seller, engages in very little manufacturing and assembly, but instead has built a 
business on distribution. Rising firms may be capturing manufacturing activities, but the 
former manufacturers have increasingly specialized in high-value non-manufacturing 
activities. In many cases, these firms either retain control of the supply chain's rules of 
connectivity by perhaps controlling the key operating software or state-of-the-art 
processor designs in electronics, or retain control of activities that truly remain integral 
and proprietary. Examples of the latter often involve efforts by lead firms to embed 
services in the higher-end products they either manufacture or outsource. 
The point is not so much that Chinese firms are performing poorly in the 
developmental process, but quite the contrary. The point is that Chinese entrants and the 
lead firms of developed countries are jointly responding to major transformations in the 
organization of production. Their joint response is better understood as complementary 
rather than substitutable or somehow "competitive" in head-to-head terms. That then 
leads to a third point about the way the terms "industry" and "national industry" are 
understood today. In the current era of globalization and modularization certain activities 
within industries have been separated from one another and moved across national 
boundaries. Hence, in any given segment, we may see companies or countries occupying 
certain selected activities but not others. Yet, modularization is really about much more 
than that. Activities within discrete industries have been split apart, and these independent, 
highly specialized activities now cut across multiple industries. What were once distinct 
industry supply chains and markets now overlap and interact in myriad forms. It becomes 
increasingly difficult to say exactly which "industry" a given firm or country specializes 
in. Should Chinese firms be encouraged by Beijing or their provincial governments to 
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follow the conglomerate path of South Korea or the Keiretsu-alliance path of Japanese 
firms? Or can they poise a different developmental path encouraging specialization, low-
end market segmentation, and FDI to less developed markets? The evidence suggests 
Chinese firms may be on a different developmental path closer to that of Taiwan path 
then Japanese or Korean and this should impact government policy toward their 
development and globalization. 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
The present study has several limitations. Theoretically, the definition of 
diversifying strategy did not clarify whether a certain company diversifies its product 
lines or markets or both. Previous studies have suggested several ways to define and 
measure diversification strategies in terms of product lines diversifying and international 
market diversifying (Vancil, 1979; Bettis, Hall, & Prahalad，1978; Dunda & Richardson, 
1980; Crinyer & Yasai-Ardekani，1981; Wrigley, 1970; Rumelt, 1982). However, the data 
that all these established measurement methods require is difficult to access for most 
Chinese companies, for example, a firm's specialization ratio, reflected by the fraction of 
revenues accounted for by its largest single business unit; a firm's related-core ration, 
which is the fraction of a firm's revenues attributable to its largest group of somehow 
related businesses. Therefore, none of these measurements could be employed to separate 
different forms of diversification. As a result, the ratings from policy capturing were not 
clear in terms of market range, since it is possible that a company might target broader 
market selling a single product or target niche market selling a diversified range of 
products. Besides, even though the case analysis indicated that some companies pursue a 
related-diversification strategy, this term was not clarified within this thesis. Further 
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study needs to refine the definition of diversifying strategy in different aspects and the 
term "related-diversification". 
For the data, as mentioned before, there is difficulty to obtain PIMS or C-Star 
type data of Chinese companies listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen stock markets, which 
provide detailed information on both corporation and business levels. For the same 
reason, this study was not able to separate these companies' domestic and international 
performances. It is possible that companies gain success in international markets while 
they do not in domestic market, or the opposite. Another issue is about the financial 
indicators for company performance. Both return on asset and return on equity are just 
"the result of estimation, negotiation, debate and politics that can produce grossly 
inaccurate reflections of true cost and profit (John & Kaplan, 1987)", even though they 
do reflect the performance to some degree. A company's performance could be 
interpreted by many other factors, e.g., financial indicators, brand awareness, firm size, 
etc. Further research needs to evaluate a company's success by more aspects. Also, this 
research only studied the data within 5 years. Such a short period usually could not 
provide enough information for strategic studies, thus a longitudinal study might needed 
to further investigate into this matter. Last, further study should take ownership type into 
account. SOEs (state owned enterprises) in China were once favored in many means such 
as bank loaning, resource obtaining, etc. while POEs (private owned enterprises) were 
not supported so much by government. But in recent years, Central Government has 
performed the SOEs Revolution, in which only SOEs in certain industry or size are 
favored. In due course, in order to maintain the rapid growth of economics, POEs are 
more encouraged and supported. Therefore, ownership type should also be considered in 
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interpreting company performance. 
Methodologically, the policy-capturing this study employed also has its 
weaknesses. The most significant weakness is that policy-capturing studies do not and 
cannot simulate all of the richness of the contexts in which real-life decisions are made, 
nor can they provide the respondents with all of the information in the real life. After all, 
policy-capturing methodology is artificial in the sense that real-life assessing situations 
often involve more than a single set of conditions (Aiman-Smith, Scullen & Barr, 2002; 
Gorman, Clover, & Doherty，1978; Hobson &Gibson, 1983). Also, the high correlation 
between firm size and target scope might lead to the multicollinearity problem. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
China's national champions are using their advantages as domestic leaders to 
build global brands. The country's new leaders President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jiabao believe that building multinationals will help China become an economic 
superpower and have started implementing policies that will spur the growth of more 
Chinese brands. For example, as one of the world's largest manufacturers of home 
appliances, Haier captured almost half of the U.S. market for small refrigerators in 2002 
under its own brand name. Galanz manufactures one out of every three microwave ovens 
in the world, sharing 40% of the European market for its brand in 2002. However, the 
competitiveness of China's large firms after two decades of reform is still painfully weak 
in relation to the global giants in regard to the weak R&D, lack of brand development, etc 
(Nolan, 2001). 
By hypothesizing the relation between strategies Chinese companies use abroad 
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and company performances, this thesis attempts to draw implications for more China 
firms that are facing the challenges of competing on the world's stage, implications for 
policy makers and implications for disruptive strategy theory. 
Low end positioning and new market disruptive strategies suit Chinese companies 
at this stage, when they are going global. Evidence shows they earn market share by 
disrupting from lower-end and creating new demand from customers in developing 
countries who are ignored by mainstream competitors. Quantitative and qualitative data 
also show that successful China firms target wider market with related diversifying 
product lines. For the market entry order, most companies enter developing countries first. 
After seizing a sizable market, they begin planning on the move into developed markets, 
and considering shifting toward higher-end. But it is still largely in the very first phase 
for most players, with the exception of Haier, which bravely marched into North America 
and did win the a considerable size of share in the niche market, and later moved into 
less difficult markets in developing countries. 
These conclusions will not hold if the unique institutional environment changes. 
In aspect of political environment, the Central government has supported and to some 
degree urged these companies by making favorable policies. The existence of potential 
market in developing world also provides these companies big opportunities for profits. 
For Chinese firms themselves, low cost advantages still exist, This is changing. These 
companies are still struggling to compete head-to-head with industrial leaders in the 
developed markets. This is also rapidly changing in China's favor. Therefore on the 
current stage, the huge markets once ignored in the developing countries are ideal source 
of profits for companies from emerging economies such as China. 
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Appendix 1. List of Identified Sixty Companies ^^  
English name Industry Revenue 
(USD Mn) 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. Oil & Gas 76,697 
CNPC Oil & Gas 69,076 
China Mobile Telecommunications 23,977 
China Telecom Corp. Ltd. Telecommunications 21,580 
Sinochem Corporation Chemicals 20,397 
Shanghai Baosteel Group Steel 19,559 
China FAW Group Corporation Automotive 15,143 
China Minmetals Co. Ltd. Trading 13,209 
Haier Group White Goods 12,202 
SAIC Automotive 12,100 
Cosco Logistics 11,302 
CNOOC Ltd. Oil & Gas 8,575 
China Network Communications Telecommunications 7,850 
Shougang Corp. Steel 7,485 
China Worldbest Co. Ltd. Pharmaceutical 5,864 
BOE Electronics 5,454 
SVA Group Electronics 5,228 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group Corp. Steel 5,118 
TCL Group Electronics 5,091 
Lenovo 16 Electronics 5,069 
Shanghai Electric Group Industrial Electronics 4,766 
Panzhihua Iron & Steel Group Steel 4,106 
•Midea group White Goods 3,939 
•Huawei Technologies Telecom Equipment 3,812 
Panda Electronics Electronics 3,386 
Jinan iron & steel group corp. Steel 3,313 
Hisense Group Brown Goods 3,300 
China National Machinery Industry Corp Machinery 3,254 
China International Marine Containers (Group) Ltd. Logistics 3,213 
Hunan Valin iron & steel group Steel 3,148 
Shanghai Textile holding group corp. Textiles 3,028 
Sinotruck Automotive 2,828 
Brilliance Auto Automotive 2,739 
Sinotrans Logistics 2,646 
ZTE Telecom Equipment 2,566 
*Wanxiang Group Auto parts 2,522 
Chunlan Group Corp. Brown Goods 2,382 
•SVT Electronics 2,321 
Sinopharm Pharmaceutical 2,140 
Guangdong Silk Imp. & Exp Corp Textiles 1,961 
15 Source: IBM China 
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English name Industry Revenue 
(USD Mn) 
*Younger Group Textiles 1,686 
Sichuan Changhong Brown Goods 1,680 
Gree Electric Appliances,Inc White Goods 1,673 
Konka Brown Goods 1,616 
Tianjin Pharmaceutical Holding Pharmaceutical 1,456 
*CHINT Group Electronics 1,445 
•Hangzhou Wahaha Group Beverages 1,379 
Nanjing Auto Automotive 1,347 
•Guangdong Galanz Group (co.’ Ltd.) White Goods 1，325 
* Sky worth Electronics 1,295 
Yuchai Machinery 1,294 
Dongfang Electric Corporation Industrial Electronics 1,293 
•People Electronic Appliance Group Electronics 1,239 
*Aux Group White Goods 1,239 
Ningbo Bird Mobile Devices 1,239 
Daxian Industrial Electronics 1,115 
Tsingdao Brewery Group Beverages 1,042 
•Lifan Motorcycles 823 
*Geely Automotive 624 
Chery Automotive 593 
* POEs: companies with 50 percent or more ownership by private investors 
Note: Certain companies are active in multiple industry categories. Such companies were 
categorized in the industry where they are dominant players. 
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Appendix 2. Strategies Definition and Rating Sheets 
COMPANY COMPETITIVE STRATEGY DEFINITIONS 
(Regarding positioning and scope) 
1. Broad Range of Products: capability ofproducing products from a broad range 
2. Premium Pricing Product: products in high-price segments 
3. Product Quality Control: enforcing strict product quality control procedures 
4. Product Targeted Primary at One Type Customer: 
5. Customer Service: extensive customer service capabilities 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features): capability to make improvement 
on existing products 
7. Serving Special Markets: Serving specifically chosen Geographic Markets 
8. Marketing Innovation: innovation in marketing techniques and methods 
9. Brand identification: capability of building brand identification 
10. Advertising Propensity: promotion and advertising above industry average 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets: capability to manufacture special products 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions: having a good reputation in a 
particular area within industry 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation: innovation in manufacturing processes, usually 
to control costs. 
14. Cost Reduction: continuing overriding concern for cost reduction 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 02 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately 1 I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control X — 一 ！ ^ ^ Z Z I I I ^ ^ I I ^ 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Adverti sing Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an 'X' in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow ~T~ 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 02 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately 1 I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction I I I 丨 X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X，in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 02 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately 1 I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1 • Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control — X — 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction I I I I X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end ~T~ 2 " T " ~T~ 6 ~T~ High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 02 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately 1 I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control X 一 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 05 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately Moderately 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control X 一 — 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
Ia Cost Reduction | | | | I X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 




Company Code: 06 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control “ X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) x 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction | X | 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end " T " 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 




Company Code: 05 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately I Moderately 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control “ X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Adverti sing Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13 • Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 




Company Code: 08 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately I I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 1 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer x 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets x 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets x 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions x 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 09 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately Moderately 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X | 一 ~ 
2 . Premium Pricing Product X 
3 . Product Quality Control X 
4 . Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6 . Emphasis on R & D for New Products (Features) X 
7 . Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8 . Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
1 0 . Advertising Propensity X 
1 1 . Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 




Company Code: 05 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately Moderately I ‘ 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control — X 一 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13 • Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction — X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 




Company Code: 06 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control “ X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction | X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X，in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 12 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately I I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1 • Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction | X | 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 02 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately 1 I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control — X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 




Company Code: 08 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately Moderately 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control 一 一 X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Adverti sing Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction 丨 X | | _ 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an 'X' in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 ~T~ High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 




Company Code: 15 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately Moderately 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control X — 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10• Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction | X 丨 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X，in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 16 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately I I Moderately I “ 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control — X — 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an 'X' in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 17 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately | I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X ‘ 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control — X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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Rating Sheet 
Company Code: 02 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately 1 I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control “ X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10• Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction | X 厂 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 




Company Code: 05 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics Moderately Moderately 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction X 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 




Company Code: 02 
Assessment 
Firm Characteristics I Moderately 1 I Moderately I 
Low Low Average High High 
1. Broad Range of Products X 
2. Premium Pricing Product X 
3. Product Quality Control X 
4. Product Targeted primary at One Type Customer X 
5. Customer Service X 
6. Emphasis on R&D for New Products (Features) X 
7. Serving Special Geographic Markets X 
8. Innovation in Marketing Techniques and Methods X 
9. Brand Identification X 
10. Advertising Propensity X 
11. Emphasis on Niche Markets X 
12. Emphasize Smaller and Specialty Distributions X 
13. Emphasis on Process Innovation X 
14. Cost Reduction | X | 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the position Level of this firm. Place an ‘X’ in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Low-end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High-end 
Based on the information provided above and your experience and knowledge, please 
rate the market scope of this firm. Place an X in the appropriate space. 
Very Very 
Narrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad 
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12: Brilliance Auto 
13: Hisense 
14: Midea 
15: Panda Electronics 
16: SAIC 
17: BOE 
18: TCL Group 
19: Haier 
20: Sichuan Changhong 
*_The survey participants did not know the name of the companies for which they were 
assessing the strategies. 
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Appendix 4. Strategy Ratings of Sample Companies 
Position ratings 
Company Name Position 
Mean S.D. 
Brilliance Auto 5.73 0.94 
Lenovo 5.37 0.94 
TCL 5.37 0.89 
ZTE 5.26 0.90 
SAIC 5.21 0.98 
Huawei 4.80 1.01 
Midea 4.22 0.80 
Panda Electronics 4.05 0.69 
Hisense 3.55 0.88 
Haier 3.44 1.11 
BOE 2.52 0.84 
Konka 2.47 0.97 
Sichuang Changhong 2.39 0.89 
Lifan 2.35 0.09 
Geely 2.30 1.02 
Skyworth 2.27 0.73 
Chery 2.13 0.69 
Wanxiang 2.08 1.12 
Galanz 2.05 0.98 
Ningbo Bird 1.77 0.88 
Target Ratings 
Company Name Target 
Mean S.D. 
Lenovo 5.60 1.29 
SAIC 5.52 1.02 
Panda Electronics 5.44 1.17 
ZTE 5.39 1.17 
Midea 5.37 0.99 
Hisense 5.00 0.92 
TCL 4.87 1.09 
Huawei 4.73 0.98 
Haier 3.77 1.03 
Konka 3.30 1.09 
Sichuang Changhong 3.15 1.37 
Geely 2.63 0.89 
Skyworth 2.63 0.97 
Lifan 2.56 0.82 
Brilliance Auto 2.51 1.40 
Wanxiang 2.47 0.86 
Galanz 2.32 1.04 
BOE 2.26 1.04 
Ningbo Bird 1.90 1.17 
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